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Introduction
A half measure, like a little knowledge, may be a dangerous thing.
Incremental actions can prove to be a stepping stone, easing the way to
climbing higher, or a stumbling block, a barrier that makes advancement more
difficult. The risks of partial measures are particularly important in politics.
Policymakers are constantly faced with the dilemma of whether to spend
political capital on an ambitious proposal or to settle for a partial measure with
the hope that it eventually will create greater support for the more ambitious
plan. Depending on the circumstances, incrementalism can be a successful
strategy or can prove counterproductive.
The costs and benefits of incrementalism are becoming increasingly
relevant to discussions about controlling global warming. The threats posed by
global climate change are well-known. The scientific data showing that the
planet’s increasing stock of greenhouse gases will lead to massive environmental
change are no longer seriously contested. It is now routine to hear about the
dire consequences of inaction—the extinction of animal and plant species,
rising ocean levels, and dramatically higher rates of malaria and cancer, among
other concerns. Public debate in the United States and around the world is no
longer focused on whether action needs to be taken to address climate change
but on what actions are best.
The consensus answer is that, ultimately, the only effective solution to the
problem of climate change will be a multilateral agreement. The alternative—a
series of uncoordinated national-level measures—is not an effective means of
limiting greenhouse gases to sustainable levels because of international
disagreements on how to divide greenhouse gas emissions among nations and
because of the problem of carbon leakage. Currently, there is no consensus over
how greenhouse gas emissions rights should be divided among states. Even
assuming that all nations adopt some climate change regulations, if they do so
with different principles of dividing global carbon emissions, then these
uncoordinated national measures will not avoid a climate change crisis. For
instance, if the United States and the European Union adopt national-level
measures to decrease greenhouse gas production based on a historic level of
emissions while China and India adopt national-level measures based on a per
capita standard, global greenhouse gas levels will remain above sustainable
levels. This is not because any state is trying to sabotage climate change

246

Article - Rachel Brewster - 23 - Final - 2010.07.01

7/6/2010 9:31:53 AM

STEPPING STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK

mitigation efforts but rather because each state will adopt national measures
that fit its own conception of a fair division of global greenhouse gases.
At the same time, carbon leakage undercuts nonglobal efforts to reduce
levels of greenhouse gases. Because there are no purely local benefits to climate
change mitigation efforts—benefits for the regulating state come from its
decrease in emissions, regardless of greenhouse gas production in another part
of the world—the utility of unilateral measures must be judged by the global
level of greenhouse gases. The problem of carbon leakage here is crucial because
if higher environmental regulation in one nation leads to increased production
of carbon-heavy goods elsewhere, then the reductions in one nation may be
offset or nullified completely by greenhouse gas production in other parts of the
globe. If carbon leakage is high enough, unilateral national legislation may
actually increase global levels of greenhouse gases, creating the possibility that
inaction would be better than unilateral action.
Nonetheless, a number of states have adopted, or are considering adopting,
their own national-level greenhouse gas reduction programs. While advocates
of the national-level programs acknowledge that these policies are an
inadequate response to global warming, their support for national-level
legislation is premised on the idea that the measures are a step forward toward
the ultimate goal of a global agreement. But are these national measures really
steps in the right direction? Surprisingly, this question has been largely ignored
in climate change debates, even though it should be central to deciding the best
national-level response to climate change. National-level legislation can create a
demand for greater international action, but it can also preempt or frustrate
such a demand. Consequently, the widely held view that national legislation is
consistently a stepping stone to an international agreement may be overly
optimistic. The crucial question, and the one that this Article explores, is how
incremental national legislation affects the prospects for a global climate change
agreement.
The answer to this question depends on how national legislation alters
domestic politics—in the regulating state and in other states—and shapes
stakeholders’ interests in pursuing a comprehensive global solution. This Article
identifies four dynamic political mechanisms that likely will be important in the
climate change context and that might support the intuitive argument that
national legislation is likely to be a stepping stone to a global agreement. These
dynamic political effects may generate more support for a global solution, but
they may also prove ineffective and, therefore, a waste of political resources.
Worse, some of these dynamics might actually work in the opposite direction,
reducing the odds of progress at the international level.
The first mechanism involves directing resources to industries that support
a climate change treaty. National climate change regulation might promote
structural changes in the economy that will naturally result in greater political
support for greater regulation. For instance, a domestic cap-and-trade system
encourages greater reliance on cleaner energy supplies at home by raising the
costs of domestic carbon emissions. This, in turn, spurs the development of a
green energy sector that would support greater global environmental
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regulation. But there can also be effects that push in the opposite direction: A
domestic cap-and-trade system could also cause a relocation of carbon-heavy
production to developing countries, where these industries would use their
political influence to resist international efforts to place limits on greenhouse
gas production.
A second mechanism is aimed specifically at international negotiations. By
passing domestic legislation, a government might signal its leadership on the
climate change issue by demonstrating that it is committed to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. This signal might then encourage other states to do
the same. National legislation, however, is a complicated signal. The national
legislation not only signals cooperation but also the terms on which the state is
willing to cooperate. Legislation with modest goals or very thin public support
may signal that the state will not be able or willing to accept a deeper
international commitment, making an international compromise harder to
achieve.
A third mechanism is to generate industry demand for a uniform global
environmental standard. In this scenario, industries would support an
international agreement to avoid conflicting national regulations that interfere
with global commerce. For instance, California’s recent threat of state-level
legislation that would impose stringent fuel efficiency standards led the
automotive industry to accept federal fuel economy standards that were higher
than under previous federal law but lower than the California standard. Shifting
from the domestic regulatory context to the international regulatory system,
however, it is far from obvious that a patchwork regime of differing nationallevel climate change regimes would spur the development of a consistent set of
international standards. Unlike federal legislation, which applies to all states
regardless of their support for higher fuel economy standards, an international
agreement requires the consent of each nation and cannot bind jurisdictions
that do not wish voluntarily to change their environmental standards. A series
of conflicting national regulatory standards may lead to the perverse result of
making an international agreement more difficult to coordinate.
A fourth mechanism consists of cultivating greater environmental norms in
the general public. This process might work in several different ways. National
legislation could increase public acceptance of environmental norms by slowly
increasing environmental standards. It could also gradually increase popular
political demands for lower greenhouse emissions. Finally, it could help to build
coalitions between environmental groups and industry if, as is often suggested,
the process of drafting and implementing national legislation is a positive
experience that later makes participants willing to take stronger cooperative
steps. But all of these possibilities are empirically contingent or dubious.
Certainly the public has not always come to appreciate environmental
regulation. If modest regulation leads to spikes in energy prices, the public may
grow skeptical of environmental norms. Enacting legislation may lull popular
demands for stronger measures if the public believes that the necessary action
has already been taken. And alliances between environmental groups and
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industry that can be forged to pass domestic legislation may not extend to
stricter international legislation that creates newly divergent interests.
The general lesson is that we should not conclude that all national climate
change legislative proposals are worth substantial political investment. By no
means is this an argument against all efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions at
the national level. Instead, this Article should lead policymakers and academics
to analyze more carefully the dynamic political impact of domestic proposals.
By better understanding what aspects of national-level measures provide a basis
for greater support for an international agreement—and what measures are
likely to be pitfalls—we can make progress in identifying the kinds of measures
that are genuinely worth pursuing.
Toward this end, this Article proceeds to examine the key features of the
Waxman-Markey Bill (which passed in the House on June 26, 2009) and the
Lieberman-Warner Bill (the most advanced draft produced by the Senate).
These two bills are representative of current legislative approaches to regulating
greenhouse gas emissions, which together include most of the design elements
likely to be on the table in national climate change policy debates in the United
States and elsewhere. As it turns out, some of the design elements of these bills
are likely to spur positive political dynamics, increasing the probability of an
international agreement, while others are likely to be counterproductive. Still
other measures in the legislation are difficult to assess theoretically, because
they are likely to be constructive on some mechanisms (such as relocating
economic resources) but counterproductive on others (such as building public
support for greater regulation). The purpose of this Article is not to pass
judgment on these two particular proposals but to develop a constructive
framework of analysis that can also be used to evaluate new national legislative
proposals, either in the United States or in other countries.
At a higher level of theoretical abstraction, the Article also aspires to
contribute to the international relations theory of “two-level” (domestic and
international) games. Climate change is a good case study of how domestic
legislation can have dynamic effects on a state’s international bargaining
position. National legislation is not simply a static marker of how far a state is
willing to compromise, as most international relations theory assumes. It is also
a source of change in domestic preferences that define the set of achievable
international agreements. In climate change and many other contexts, national
legislation will affect domestic politics in ways that have significant
consequences for subsequent international bargaining.
This Article provides a framework for judging whether national legislation
is a stepping stone or stumbling block to achieving a global agreement. Part I
lays out the model of a two-level game with domestic and international
bargaining concerning international public goods. It develops the core of the
argument that there are several mechanisms by which domestic legislation can
be a stepping stone or stumbling block to an international agreement and
addresses each mechanism in the context of climate change. Parts II and III
apply this framework to the issue of climate change. Part II reviews the public
goods nature of global warming, the issue of carbon leakage, international
249
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negotiations over climate change thus far, and the inability of either national
legislation or uncoordinated cross-national action to solve the problem of
global warming. Part III analyzes the provisions of the Waxman-Markey and
Lieberman-Warner proposals. This Part demonstrates that some design features
of the bills are beneficial while others are counterproductive. Part IV concludes
by discussing the broader implications of this work. This Part discusses how
domestic measures have influenced international negotiations for a multilateral
agreement in other public goods contexts. Specifically, it examines the effect of
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a unilateral measure designed
to regulate international corruption, on treaty negotiations at the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Part highlights how
the analysis developed here is relevant to a much broader spectrum of global
public goods.
I.

Mechanisms of Incrementalism

This Part discusses the static and dynamic effects of national legislation on
international negotiations for a climate change treaty regime. To do so, it uses
the framework of a two-level game where politics on the domestic level
determines the set of achievable international agreements on the international
level. Section I.A sets out this two-level game framework. Section I.B analyzes
four ways in which national legislation has the potential to create or to
undermine greater domestic support for an international agreement. This
Section provides the foundation for evaluating national legislative proposals.
A. Evaluating Incremental Measures: Dynamic and Static Effects
When a comprehensive policy measure is not politically feasible, are partial
measures worthwhile?1 Are these measures building blocks or stumbling blocks
to an international agreement? Valuing incremental measures involves a static
analysis and a dynamic analysis. The static analysis asks what the immediate and
direct effects of the policy are. For instance, if the United States adopts climate
change legislation, what will be the country’s reduction in greenhouse gas
1.

250

Discussions of incrementalism fall along two axes. The first axis is whether there is
learning from incremental measures that improves the later outcome. This
question goes to the optimal means of selecting a measure: Is the best means to
experiment as we go or to enact one comprehensive solution? Compare Robert E.
Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy (1982) (arguing against
incrementalism), with Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,”
19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959) (arguing in favor of piecemeal decision-making
because information is gained as policies are implemented). The second axis is
whether a more comprehensive measure is politically feasible. This question asks
whether the comprehensive program is something that realistically can be
achieved. If the answer is “no,” then the question is whether some incremental
measure is better: Should the perfect be the enemy of the good? This Article
focuses on the second axis of incrementalism.
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emissions? The dynamic analysis asks how the measure will affect the system. If
the United States adopts climate change legislation, how will this affect
greenhouse gas production around the globe?2 This view requires an analysis of
the longer-term and indirect effects of the policy change, including how the
policy alters incentives for private and public actors at home and abroad. The
dynamic analysis also involves a time element: how the policy change shapes the
cost and benefits of policy changes at the next decision point. A decision to
establish a carbon tax is far more costly after a nation has instituted a cap-andtrade system than it is when a nation is making the initial decision to adopt a
cap-and-trade or carbon tax system. This dynamic analysis often goes under the
title of path dependence, but there can be several different causal mechanisms
at play (and often pushing in different directions).
In national debates about climate change legislation, the dynamic analysis is
more important than the static analysis to the issue of finding a comprehensive
solution to the climate change crisis. Focusing on the direct effects of national
legislation—that is, the national reductions in greenhouse gas emission
expected from the legislation—is misleading. There are few serious claims that
the measures taken by one nation (or even a few nations) in isolation can solve
the climate change crisis. Focusing on the static level leads to debates about
whether unilateral measures pass a cost-benefit analysis (which they almost
never do because the atmosphere is a public good3) and does not address the
real issue of whether these measures will galvanize efforts for a coordinated
international response, which should be the primary goal of all climate change
legislation.4 The focus on dynamic effects is additionally important because
2.

See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Pierson, Increasing Returns] (exploring
dynamic analysis as a new lens for reevaluating “path dependence”); see also
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance (1990); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions,
and Social Analysis (2004) [hereinafter Pierson, Politics in Time].

3.

An Economic View of the Environment, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
analysis/stavins/?p=206 (June 29, 2009, 12:28 EDT) [hereinafter Stavins, National
Climate Change Policy]. Stavins acknowledges that national-level action does not
pass a cost-benefit analysis that is focused on purely static, national-level effects:
The environmental benefits of any single nation’s reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions are spread worldwide, unlike the costs. This
means that for any single country, the costs of action will inevitably
exceed its direct benefits, despite the fact that the global costs of action
will be less than global benefits.
Id.

4.

At least one debate on the value of national climate change measures focuses on
the static analysis of federal legislation without considering dynamic effects. Eric
Posner and Cass Sunstein argue that the U.S. decision to adopt emissionsreducing measures unilaterally would not pass a cost-benefit analysis because such
measures (taken in isolation) will have next to no effect on global climate change.
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L.J. 1565,
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static effects and dynamic effects can move in opposite directions. National
legislation can have negative static effects on greenhouse gas emissions (for
instance, if carbon leakage exceeds 100%) but have positive dynamic effects if
the legislation leads to comparable actions internationally. Similarly, nationallevel measures that have beneficial static effects can have negative dynamic
effects. A carbon tariff that decreases carbon leakage will help to decrease global
emissions in the short term but will build resistance to an international
agreement from industries that benefit from the protection afforded by the
tariff.
This dynamic analysis plays out in a two-level policy space. A two-level
game is a framework from international relations theory that examines the
relationship between policymaking on the domestic and international planes.5
This framework has proven to be a productive vein for international law and
international relations theorists to explore the effect of national politics on
international negotiations and the reciprocal influence of international law on
domestic policymaking.6 Robert Putnam developed the idea of a two-level game
1600 (2008) (“[I]t is far from clear that the United States could have taken
unilateral action that would have created benefits for the rest of the world greater
than the cost to the United States.”). Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzman reply
that the costs to the United States of climate change are so great that unilateral
measures would pass a cost-benefit analysis regardless of the actions of other
states. See Jody Freeman & Andrew T. Guzman, Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate
Change & U.S. Interests 62 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1357690,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357690 (“Though international
cooperation should be pursued, the reluctance of others to fully engage the
problem is not a sound reason for inaction by the United States. Whatever others
do, the United States should move aggressively to reduce global [greenhouse gas]
emissions.”).
5.

See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 434 (1988) (offering two-level games as a framework for
analyzing comparative politics and international relations); see also Kenneth W.
Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International
Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 5, 22-24 [hereinafter Abbott, Rational Choice
Institutionalism] (discussing the application of two-level games to the study of
international law); Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter
Abbott, International Relations Theory] (discussing the application of
international relations theory to international law more generally).

6.

For scholarship in international law, see Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age
of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167 (1999); Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute
Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 Va. L. Rev. 251 (2006); Ryan Goodman,
Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 Am. J. Int’l L.
531 (2002); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
Yale L.J. 1935 (2002); Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005);
George Norman & Joel Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99
Am. J. Int’l L. 541 (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan
Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of

252

Article - Rachel Brewster - 23 - Final - 2010.07.01

7/6/2010 9:31:53 AM

STEPPING STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK

where national policymakers bargain over a policy issue in the international
sphere as well as the domestic sphere.7 For example, the nation’s executive
official may want to achieve a trade or environmental agreement with another
nation or set of nations, but the legislature must be willing to ratify the
agreement. Thus, to achieve an agreement, the executive must bargain on two
planes simultaneously. She must secure an agreement that is acceptable to the
representatives of the other states and to her own legislature. Bargaining at each
level is not independent: What is achievable at the international level influences
what the domestic legislature will accept, and the realities of domestic politics
can affect the outcomes of international bargaining.
Putnam’s analysis was groundbreaking because he demonstrated that a
domestic constraint (here, the legislative ratification process) could be a
bargaining advantage.8 If there is a range of agreements that all national
governments can accept, then an international agreement that benefits all
nations is achievable. The subsequent negotiations are distributional; they
consist of selecting between differing treaty drafts. Each nation wants its
preferred treaty draft to be adopted, but it would benefit from the adoption of
any draft in the acceptable range. Putnam demonstrated that a government’s
bargaining position is strengthened when it can credibly commit to accepting
only its preferred treaty draft (or one that is very close). National legislation is
the means by which a government can credibly commit. If the executive official
has a domestic policy constraint, such as legislation that constrains what the
executive can offer on the international level, then this constraint increases the
bargaining power of the executive in the international system.
Of course, a national-level constraint can also doom international
negotiations. When the range of acceptable agreements is small, then a
miscalculation at the national level can eliminate the “win set” entirely. For
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998); and Richard H.
Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO:
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 231 (1997).
For scholarship in political science, see Simon Hug & Thomas Konig, In View
of Ratification: Government Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam
Intergovernmental Conference, 56 Int’l Org. 447 (2002); Miles Kahler, The Causes
and Consequences of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 661 (2000); Howard Lehman &
Jennifer McCoy, The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988
Brazilian Debt Negotiations, 44 World Pol. 600 (1992); Sophie Meunier, What
Single Voice? European Institutions and the EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 54 Int’l
Org. 103 (2000); and Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International
Environmental Institutions, 41 Int’l Stud. Q. 719 (1997).
7.

Putnam, supra note 5, at 434.

8.

Abbott, Rational Choice Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 23; Andrew Moravscik,
Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining, in
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic
Politics 3, 4-5, 33 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds.,
1993).
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instance, if the United States Congress, in its attempt to secure a high
proportion of the joint gains of international cooperation, imposes a domestic
constraint on the executive that puts the American position outside of the range
of possible international outcomes, then treaty negotiations will collapse.9
Similarly, the strategy will backfire if used by multiple governments. If two or
more governments insist on their preferred treaty terms (and these demands are
backed up by national legislation that binds the hands of the executive), then
the win set of acceptable agreements will collapse and the mutually beneficial
treaty regime will not come into force.
This analysis makes use of the two-level game framework in examining
global climate change negotiations. Understanding the relationship between
national legislation and global climate change negotiations requires an analysis
of each level. Domestic politics and international politics take place in different
fora, but the two levels are not independent. The set of policies that are feasible
on the international level is defined by domestic politics.10 International politics
can also change the incentives of public and private actors and thus influence
the domestic level.11 Particularly in the climate change issue area, international
politics can have a powerful effect on domestic politics. A comprehensive
solution to global warming is achievable only through international
negotiations, and, therefore, a state’s willingness to undertake costly actions will
depend, in part, on the credibility of the international commitments made by
other states.
The analysis here also extends conventional understandings of two-level
games in a couple of ways. First, this analysis highlights that national legislation
may be an opening bid, not a constraint, in international negotiations.
Following on Putnam’s example, most uses of the two-level game framework
view domestic legislation as a limit in international negotiations. National
measures are enacted as a ceiling for what the state will accept in international
bargaining. Yet domestic politics need not always be a constraint on
international bargaining. Support for domestic legislation is based on the idea
that the national measure will build international support.12 Second, and more
importantly, this Article demonstrates the dynamic effects of national
legislation on international bargaining. The two-level game framework

9.

See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?, 37 J. Conflict
Resol. 403, 403-05 (1993); Putnam, supra note 5, at 433-41. This situation is similar
to the battle of the sexes game. See infra Subsection I.B.2.

10.

See, e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical
Analysis (1959) (describing the effect of domestic politics on international
politics as the “second image”).

11.

See, e.g., Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of
Domestic Politics, 32 Int’l Org. 881 (1978) (describing the effect of international
politics on domestic politics as the “second image reversed”).

12.

See infra Section III.A (discussing how domestic legislation is viewed as a stepping
stone towards an international agreement).
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generally takes a static view of international negotiations. Domestic legislation is
a marker of domestic preferences: National-level measures are a statement of
how far a country is willing to compromise at any one point in time.13 Thus,
legislation is a reflection, not a cause, of domestic preferences. This Article
challenges this view by focusing on the dynamic effects of national legislation.
National laws are more than a one-off picture of national policy preferences at a
single point in time. As this analysis explores, national legislation can have a
dynamic effect on domestic politics, setting a trajectory for the evolution of
domestic policy preferences.
This Article emphasizes that national-level measures are a cause of policy
preference, both at home and abroad. Domestic legislation changes the political
environment, shifting the interests of public interest groups and industries in
supporting an international agreement. It can thus broaden the range of
mutually acceptable agreements on the international plane as well as limit it.
Domestic measures create economic and political incentives that, over time,
redefine what policies governments need to coordinate as well as how best to
coordinate. Conceptualizing national legislation as a cause of domestic political
change also highlights the dangers of national legislation. If national legislation
is evaluated only on its static effects, then we may overlook the longer-term
impact of government action. This Article attempts to analyze the dynamic
effects of national legislation by examining four causal mechanisms: the
reallocation of economic resources, leadership in international negotiations,
demands for uniform regulation, and evolving public norms regarding
environmental preservation. The next Section discusses these mechanisms in
detail.
B. National Climate Change Legislation
This project does not hope to provide a comprehensive answer to the
question of whether incremental national measures are beneficial or
counterproductive in all areas. Rather, it seeks to determine what types of
national measures will have positive political dynamics and thus can build
support for a climate change agreement. This project analyzes four mechanisms
by which incremental legislation can build support for a comprehensive
international agreement. All four can either lead to greater support for an
international agreement or entrench resistance to it.
1.

Resource Allocation

National-level measures can alter the dynamics of the policy process over
time by directing resources towards groups that have an interest in advancing
that policy. The idea here is that incremental measures will promote structural
changes in the economy, which provide additional resources to constituencies
that support a particular policy. In discussions of trade liberalization, for
13.

See Putnam, supra note 5, at 434.
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example, more liberal trade policies are thought to create positive political
feedback effects that encourage further trade liberalization. Lower tariff levels
promote the economic interests of export-oriented industries and harm
import-competing industries. Over time, export-oriented industries have more
resources to lobby for additional liberalization while import-competing
industries have less.14 Similar accounts can be found elsewhere.15 For instance,
social security policies are often described as the third rail of politics because
they direct resources to a constituency that aggressively defends and promotes
these policies to continue the flow of resources to that constituency.
Not all incremental measures towards an international goal, however, are
beneficial. In the trade context, governments frequently engage in regional trade
liberalization that provides lower barriers to trade to states in the regional
agreement relative to states outside of the region. The question asked by many
economists and political scientists is whether such regional measures are
beneficial or detrimental to greater multilateral liberalization.16 Most
economists consider global free trade to be the best policy option because it
offers the greater economic gains. But when global free trade is not immediately
attainable, are regional agreements for like-minded states that wish to adopt
more aggressive free trade policies beneficial? In other words, are regional
agreements a second-best option that advance efforts for global trade or will the
regional agreement set states on a path that makes the greater multilateral trade
harder to achieve?
Empirical work by Daniel Kono indicates that the answer to this question
depends on whether the regional agreements are trade-creating or tradediverting (directing resources to industries that are regionally competitive but
not globally competitive).17 Trade-creating regimes provide greater material
14.

See Michael Gilligan, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation,
and Collective Action in American Trade Policy (1997); North, supra note
2; Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects
Domestic Political Alignments (1989).

15.

The same is true of institutions. See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127
(1999).

16.

See, e.g., Miles Kahler, International Institutions and the Political
Economy of Integration (1995); Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism,
Multilateralism and Deeper Integration (1996); Kenneth A. Oye,
Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political
Economy in the 1930s and 1980s (1992); Jagdish Bhagwati, Departures from
Multilateralism: Regionalism and Aggressive Unilateralism, 100 Econ. J. 1304, 1312
(1990); Wilfred J. Ethier, Regionalism in a Multilateral World, 106 J. Pol. Econ.
1214 (1998); Lawrence H. Summers, Regionalism and the World Trading System, in
Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones: A Symposium
Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 295 (1991), available
at http://12.35.11.68/publicat/sympos/1991/S91summe.pdf.

17.

See Daniel Yuichi Kono, Are Free Trade Areas Good for Multilateralism? Evidence
from the European Free Trade Association, 46 Int’l Stud. Q. 507 (2002); Daniel Y.
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support to globally competitive industries, who will then lobby for greater
multilateral trade agreements. Trade-diverting agreements, by contrast, direct
resources toward industries that are regionally but not globally competitive and
that will consequently oppose greater multilateral liberalization. When a
regional agreement is trade-diverting, incremental trade liberalization puts
states on a path to achieve a local maximum at the cost of a global maximum.
Consequently, Kono argues that it is not the existence of a regional agreement
but the membership and content of the agreement that produces the positive or
negative political feedback effect.
In the climate change debate, national legislation is thought to direct
resources towards energy sources that produce lower levels of greenhouse gas
emissions. Either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system raises the cost of
carbon emissions. The higher costs of emissions encourage the relocation of
carbon production in the static analysis but should also encourage investment
in carbon mitigation systems as well as sources of energy with lower emissions
(and this investment should make mitigation and low-emissions energy sources
cheaper).18 In the dynamic analysis, lowering the cost of emissions reductions
makes a global agreement easier to achieve because it lowers the cost of climate
change mitigation for everyone. The dynamic political effects can also be
positive if American industry becomes one of the major providers of low
emissions energy. Not only would national legislation direct more resources
towards these industries, but the industries also would have an interest in
lobbying for an international agreement that would raise the global demand for
their product.19 Even if national-level measures lead to carbon leakage in the

Kono, When Do Trade Blocs Block Trade?, 51 Int’l Stud. Q. 165 (2007). For the
distinction between trade-creating and trade-diverting regimes, see Jacob Viner,
The Customs Union Issue (1950).
18.

As Carol Browner, the Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change,
recently argued:
During [the 1990 Clean Air Act] debate industry projected that the cost
per ton of sulfur dioxide reductions would be over a thousand dollars. It
turned out to be a fraction because American innovation and ingenuity
rose to the occasion and we found solutions that allowed us to do it more
cheaply once industry had that certainty.
Roundtable Interview by the Wall Street Journal with President Barack Obama,
Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Carol Browner, Assistant to the President for
Energy and Climate Change, in Wash., D.C. (June 28, 2009) [hereinafter
Roundtable Interview], available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/28/
roundtable-interview-with-obama-on-climate-bill/.

19.

John M. Broder, White House Steps Up Climate Efforts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2009,
at A19 (describing the White House claim that climate change legislation will help
create a new green-energy industry). President Obama emphasized:
[A]s we transition into this clean energy economy we are going to see, I
think, an enormous amount of economic activity and job production
emerging. I know that the opponents of this bill kept on suggesting this
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short term, the legislation can foster greater support for an international
agreement within the United States and internationally by lowering the costs of
compliance with that agreement.
But this mechanism of resource allocation also can produce unintended
negative political feedback effects. National legislation can lead carbonintensive producers to shift production to a lower-regulation nation. Although
this shift has positive political effects for the passage of future climate change
legislation in the United States by selection effects (polluters leave the
jurisdiction and thus do not mobilize in national politics to oppose further
regulation), it can lead to greater resistance among other nations to an
international agreement. Industries that relocate to developing countries can
lobby against an international agreement in those jurisdictions and may have
greater political influence in developing states than in fully industrialized states.
For instance, if carbon leakage from American steel producers leads to the
expansion of the Chinese steel industry (due to either the relocation of
American firms or the expansion of Chinese firms), then there is a growing base
of manufacturers in China who may resist an international agreement that
raises their costs.
2.

Leadership in International Negotiations

Leadership in the international arena is a second mechanism that can lead
to positive political feedback effects. This mechanism is explicitly aimed at the
international audience. The idea here is that U.S. domestic action is not a
solution to the climate change problem but demonstrates to the international
community that the United States is willing to undertake costly action to
address the global warming crisis. Robert Stavins, head of Harvard’s Belfer
Center on Climate Change, maintains that “the credibility of the U.S. as a
participant, let alone as a leader, in shaping the international regime is
dependent upon our demonstrated willingness to take actions at home.”20
The idea that unilateral action leads to international leadership can be
analyzed through the lens of signaling theory.21 Domestic legislation is a signal

was a jobs-killer, but everybody I talk to, when we think about how are
we going to drive this economy forward post-bubble, keep on pointing to
the opportunities for us to transition to a clean energy economy as a
driver of economic growth.
Roundtable Interview, supra note 18.
20.

Stavins, National Climate Change Policy, supra note 3.

21.

Signaling theory is commonly used to explain international law and international
relations. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of
International Law (2005); Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law
Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008); Tom Ginsburg & Richard
McAdams, Adjudication in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute
Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229 (2004); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A
Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999); Oona A.
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to the international community that the United States is looking to engage
other states in treaty negotiations regarding global warming. Because the United
States is taking action without the agreement of other states, this legislation is
arguably a credible signal of an American willingness to compromise on climate
change issues.22 The signal is intended to make an international agreement
easier to achieve. Other states observe the signal, are more likely to find it
credible because it is costly, and then adjust their postures toward international
negotiations accordingly. This unselfishness on the part of the United States
raises the possibility that other states will act similarly. Domestic action is not a
necessary precondition to an international agreement, but it is supposed to ease
the negotiation process.
An agreement over climate change is different than other international
cooperative ventures in that it is largely a distributional game, not one of
assurance. It almost goes without saying that nations prefer to adopt a set of
policies that would solve the climate change problem. The issue is how much
each state is willing to pay to do so. Because the major issue in achieving a global
climate change mitigation treaty is distribution, leadership is demonstrated by a
willingness to undertake a significant commitment.23 In this context, the signal
the United States is sending through domestic legislation is not so much a signal
of cooperation but a signal of how much it is willing to contribute.
To see the difference, compare two different games that international
relations theorists often use to describe interactions in international
negotiations: the stag hunt and the battle of the sexes.24 These games are
obviously a simplification of the negotiation process, but they are useful
because they demonstrate the strategic dynamics at work.25
The stag hunt game is one of assurance; the states consider collective action
to solve a problem but are unsure of whether other states have an interest in
pursuing collective action.26 The story behind the stag hunt game is that there

Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International
Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469 (2005); Kal Rastiala, Form and Substance in
International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 581 (2005).
22.

See Stavins, National Climate Change Policy, supra note 3.

23.

See Peter Baker, Poor Nations Reject a Target on Emissions Cuts, N.Y. Times, July 8,
2009, at A1 (discussing the longstanding divide between developed and developing
economies concerning who should bear the costs of mitigating the effects of
climate change).

24.

See Richard McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game
Theory, and the Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 209 (2009).

25.

See id.

26.

See Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 World Pol. 167
(1978); Lisa Martin, Interest, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 Int’l Org. 765, 781
(1992).
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are two hunters who have to decide whether to hunt a stag or rabbits.27 To hunt
a stag successfully, both hunters have to commit to the enterprise. Both hunters
eat well if they both hunt stag (giving them each a payoff of 4). A hunter acting
alone cannot bring down a deer, and, if he tries when the other hunter does not,
then he will not eat (giving him a payoff of 0). If the hunter is acting alone, then
the only prey that he can catch is rabbits (giving him a payoff of 2). The hunter
is eating but not as well as he would with his share of the stag. The hunter
prefers to hunt a stag (this provides the highest payoff) but will only engage in a
stag hunt if he is assured that the other party will also hunt stag. Here, a signal
of cooperation influences the other party’s actions because it provides the
necessary assurance.28 The state will cooperate if it believes that other states will
cooperate as well; distribution issues do not exist. A signal of cooperation will
alter the beliefs of the observing states and thereby influence those states’
actions.
Table 1: The Stag Hunt Game (Assurance)
(Hunter 1, Hunter 2)
Hunt Stag
Hunt Stag
4, 4
Hunt Rabbit
2, 0

Hunt Rabbit
0, 2
2, 2

In a battle of the sexes game, the parties again wish to coordinate their
actions, but there is a distributional conflict. The game is based on a gender
stereotype.29 A couple has to decide how to spend their night on the town. They
both want to be together above all but have different preferences on what
activity to attend. The man wants to attend the boxing match, and the woman
wants to attend the ballet. Each person gets a payoff of 2 if they spend the
evening together, and the person whose preferred activity is chosen receives an
additional payoff of 1. So the woman has a payoff of 3 when the couple attends
the ballet, while the man receives a payoff of 2. If the couple attends the boxing
match, the man receives a payoff of 3, while the woman receives 2. Once one
party can credibly commit to a position—say, buying season tickets to the
ballet—then the other party is better off accepting the other’s choice but does
not realize the same utility. Here, assuring cooperation is only part of the
problem, the other part being the decision of how to distribute the costs or

27.

Douglas Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and
the Law 41-42 (1998); James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political
Scientists (1994).

28.

McAdams, supra note 24, at 220-21.

29.

See Morrow, supra note 27, at 91-92. Morrow suggests a politically correct name
for the game: the “Contest of the Individuals with Neither Gender nor Sexual
Orientation Specified.” Id. In the game, Pat and Chris have different preferences
for spending their vacation at the beach or the mountains.
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benefits of coordination.30 Consequently, the content of the statement—the
distributional allocation offered—is as important as the signal that cooperation
is desired.31
Table 2: The Battle of the Sexes (Distribution)
(Woman, Man)
Ballet
Ballet
3, 2
Boxing Match
0, 0

Boxing Match
1, 1
2, 3

Global negotiations over climate change include elements of both the stag
hunt game and the battle of the sexes.32 States look for evidence that other
members of the international community are willing to take action in
addressing climate change. Cooperation in climate change is not a dichotomous
choice. The relevant question is not whether states are willing to act but how
much they are willing to do. Any signal sent by the United States (or another
state) is a double communication: whether the state will cooperate and on what
terms. In the climate change arena, the second signal is as important as the first.
Although leadership is often cited as a reason for passing domestic
legislation, popular discussions of leadership in climate change negotiations
rarely define what leadership is. Unless all domestic action would qualify as
leadership, popular discussions do not give content to the idea of leadership in
the provision of a global public good. Certainly the unilateral provision of the
good would qualify as leadership. Where international coordination is
necessary to provide a global public good, however, leadership has to include
other elements, such as bearing a disproportionately large share of the burden
of providing the good or prodding other states to adopt changes. In a stag hunt
game, the passage of climate change legislation before international
negotiations could be sufficient to assure the other parties that the state wants
to cooperate. This signal might then be leadership if the signaling party were a
significant enough player to establish cooperation as the dominant strategy. Yet,
in a battle of the sexes game, climate change legislation could be a signal of the
state’s approach on how costs for the good should be distributed. A leadership
signal in this situation would be that the state is willing to bear more than its

30.

See Stephen Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier, 43 World Pol. 336, 339 (1991); see also Martin, supra note 26, at
775.

31.

See Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, 246
(2009) (discussing how, in coordination situations, treaty negotiators can have
mixed motives between wanting to form an agreement and wanting an agreement
that provides them with the largest share of the gains).

32.

At least two authors have described international climate change negotiations in
terms of the stag hunt game. See Alfred Endres & Cornelia Ohl, Introducing
“Cooperative Push”: How Inefficient Environmental Policy (Sometimes!) Protects the
Global Commons Better, 111 Pub. Choice 285, 287-89 (2002).
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share of the cost to achieve a coordinated outcome. In terms of the battle of the
sexes games, this would be the man’s accepting a night at the ballet (or the
woman’s accepting a night at the boxing match) to ensure that coordination is
achieved. If the signal is that the state is willing to coordinate but only on its
own terms, i.e., the man insisting on the boxing match or the woman insisting
on the ballet, then coordination may be possible but it is not made any easier.
Such action would not constitute leadership.
Accordingly, domestic legislation may send a complex message to the
international community. The passage of domestic limits on carbon emissions
may place the United States on the moral high ground—committing to lower
emissions even without a reciprocal promise by other states to do so. This move
may convince other states that cooperation on climate change is a realistic goal
and thereby increase those states’ willingness to compromise as well.
The domestic legislation also can signal the state’s approach to distribution.
The signal is not only whether the state wants to cooperate but on what terms
the state will cooperate. Thus, ambitious domestic action may be a signal of
leadership where more modest domestic commitments may signal an aversion
to shouldering a significant share of the costs. A state’s domestic legislation is
not the ceiling for what the government can commit to in international
negotiations. States can act domestically first and then commit to great cuts as
part of an international treaty negotiation. Yet, as a signal of the state’s likely
negotiating strategy, the state’s domestic legislation can be a positive or a
negative signal of its willingness to sign on to a treaty, let alone take a leadership
role. For instance, the Japanese government pledged in June 2009 to decrease its
emissions to 92% of 1990 levels (which is 85% of 2005 levels) by 2020.33 Although
this statement was designed to establish Japanese international leadership on
climate change issues, environmental groups decried the statement as
insufficiently ambitious.34 Similarly, the European Union has expressed its
frustration with the lack of ambition in American proposals to decrease
domestic emissions to 97% of the 2005 level by 2012.35 Certainly, passing any
domestic legislation is a better signal than not passing any domestic legislation,
but not all legislative proposals will signal leadership.

33.

John Murphy, Japan Pledges To Cut Emissions by 15%, Wall St. J., June 11, 2009,
at A7.

34.

See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Sets Emissions Targets, and No One Seems Pleased, N.Y.
Times, June 11, 2009, at A8; Posting of James Kanter to Green,
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/tsunami-of-criticism-for-japansco2-goals/ (June 10, 2009, 12:02 EDT).

35.

James M. Broder & James Kanter, Despite Shift on Climate by U.S., Europe Is Wary,
N.Y. Times, July 8, 2009, at A9 (reporting on Europe’s pleasure with the Obama
Administration’s seriousness regarding climate change but displeasure with
American short-term goals to reduce emissions).
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3.

Demands for a Uniform Standard

The third mechanism by which an incremental measure can generate a
positive political dynamic to support further measures is by creating an
industry demand for a uniform regulatory standard.36 Differing national, state,
or municipal standards can create a patchwork of environmental regulations
that raises the costs of doing business for key industry groups. This effect is
visible in the recent federally coordinated compromise on automotive fuel
efficiency standards.37 California threatened to enact legislation that would raise
the required fuel economy standards and applied to receive a waiver from the
Environmental Protection Agency to do so.38 Ten other states and the District
of Columbia had pledged to follow California’s lead if a waiver was granted.
The possibility of having two different fuel efficiency standards together with
greater political pressure to reduce emissions levels led the automobile industry
to agree to raise fuel efficiency over the next four years.
Using state-level measures to achieve more comprehensive federal
measures, particularly in the environmental area, is not new to politics in the
United States. According to Donald Elliott, Bruce Ackerman, and John Millian,
the Air Quality Act of 1967 was the result of state-level measures that
encouraged industry to seek a comprehensive national solution.39
Environmental activists lobbied for high environmental standards at the state
36.

See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1500-16 (2007) (explicitly
discussing this causal mechanism as a means to spur federal legislation on climate
change in the United States); see also Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate
Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National
Resistance in the USA, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1351, 1355-60 (2008).

37.

Remarks on Fuel Efficiency Standards, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 200900377
(May 19, 2009); John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, As Political Winds Shift,
Detroit Charts New Course, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2009, at A22; Henry J. Pullizi,
Obama Says New Car-Fuel Rules Give Industry ‘Certainty,’ Wall St. J., May 20,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124275189316335291.html;
Elizabeth Shogren, Obama To Announce Auto Pollution Plan, National Public
Radio, May 19, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=104287140.

38.

The EPA granted the waiver on June 30, 2009. By that time, California already had
agreed not to raise standards until 2017 as part of the federally coordinated
compromise. See Jim Tankersley, California Wins EPA Waiver on Greenhouse
Emissions, L.A. Times, June 30, 2009, at A6.

39.

E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org.
313, 326-33 (1985); see also Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean
Coal/Dirty Air (1981). Where there is federal preemption of state law, federal
law may actually weaken environmental requirements. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 429 (2002).
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level, particularly in states where strong industrial lobbies did not exist. The
resulting patchwork of state-level measures, which required different product
standards, was a burden to industry groups, who wished to sell their products
nationwide. This approach led industry groups to push for national-level
environmental legislation. The federal statute incorporated higher levels of
environmental protection than the industry groups would otherwise have
selected but established a uniform set of standards.
Applying this mechanism to climate change (and thus to the international
arena), however, is far more complicated. This mechanism can work at the
international level, but it requires greater consensus than at the domestic level.
Unlike federal legislation, which can generally preempt state action regardless of
the state’s support for higher or lower fuel economy or air quality standards, an
international agreement only binds states that choose to join the agreement.40
Where domestic legislators can bind dissenting groups within a state to a policy
that has the necessary level of legislation support (the minority acquiescence
principle), there is no such principle at the international level. For instance, if
Michigan was opposed to the 1967 Air Quality Act, it could not refuse the
legislation once there was sufficient congressional support for the measure. By
contrast, developing states (such as China and India) can refuse to join an
international agreement even if a majority of states in the international system
sign and ratify the agreement.
Creating a patchwork of national-level measures has the possibility of
generating demand for an international agreement that would apply a uniform
emissions standard. A strategy of diffuse national incrementalism on
greenhouse gas emissions policy could make international trade sufficiently
difficult for enough industry groups to establish good conditions for
international negotiations. But this is a risky strategy that could backfire.
Creating such difficult conditions for international trade could have short-term
negative economic results that would make it harder for governments to
commit to costly environmental policy.41 In addition, differing national
standards might make an international agreement more difficult by committing
states to different environmental standards.42 Instead of leading to a single
international standard, differing national legislation may harden bargaining
40.

See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 36, at 1500-16.

41.

The national regulatory patchwork may provide de facto trade protection to many
domestic groups and thus be surprisingly difficult to remove.

42.

See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1974 (2007) (discussing the dangers of adopting
state-level measures to spur federal action on climate change but noting that
national-level standards could also complicate international bargaining on a
climate agreement). This danger also exists for state-level environmental measures
where federal legislation does not emerge to unify standards. See Cary Coglianese
& Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental
Responses to Climate Change, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1411, 1424-25 (2008) (arguing
against the utility of state-level measures).
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positions and narrow (if not eliminate) the win set of possible international
agreements that are acceptable to a critical mass of states.43
4.

Cultivating Public Opinion

The fourth mechanism addresses aspects of learning as well as the
development and acceptance of environmental norms. There are several aspects
of this mechanism, which are often lumped together but need to be treated
separately. First, the idea of cultivating public opinion frequently refers to the
education of the public about the hazards of rising greenhouse gas levels.44 In
the process of lobbying for environmental regulations, interest groups educate
the public on benefits of the regulation and set the stage for greater appreciation
and concern for the environment among the public. With greater awareness of
the dangers of climate change comes the acceptance of environmental norms as
well as greater popular political demands for national and international action
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.45
Cultivating public opinion also includes the idea that the public will
develop a preference for progressively higher levels of environmental regulation
once some initial regulation is put in place.46 This taste for high levels of
regulation develops as the public learns that the costs of such regulation are
modest and observes the environmental gains from the regulation.47 Here,

43.

See James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52
Int’l Org. 269, 280-93 (1998); Putnam, supra note 5; see also Iida, supra note 9;
Jongryn Mo, The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions,
38 J. Conflict Resol. 402 (1994).

44.

See David G. Victor, Climate Change: Debating America’s Policy Options
64-67 (2004) (discussing the importance of educating the public on climate issues
and describing public opinion on climate change as “highly malleable”).

45.

See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and
Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 555, 556 (2004) (arguing
for cultural change towards great environmental norms, rather than a cost-benefit
analysis, when setting goals of climate change mitigation).

46.

The Waxman-Markey Bill: A Good Start or a Non-Starter?, Yale Env’t 360, June
18, 2009, http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2163 [hereinafter A Good
Start] (statement of Angela Anderson, Program Director for the U.S. Climate
Action Network) (“The U.S. tradition on environmental protection seems to
dictate that the most difficult step is the first one. Whether it is clean water, clean
air, or ozone depletion, we have never been able to pass a bill and walk away. We
set the policy in place, fight for swift and stringent implementation, sue when we
need to, and go back to Congress if we haven’t gotten it right.”).

47.

Cf. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization
of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 85 (2001) (describing the
conventional view that environmental legislation will reliably lead to greater
public demands for environmental protection and then challenging this view).
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national regulation is seen as the priming agent for the public acceptance of
greater levels of future national and international regulation.
Finally, this mechanism includes the process of constructing coalitions
between environmental groups and industry. National-level legislation often
requires an industry-environment alliance (the so-called Blue Green Alliance48).
The process of drafting and implementing national legislation requires
environmental and industry groups to learn about the other’s concerns and
compromise. Coalition-building can be a positive experience that outlasts the
initial legislative goal, developing trust between antagonists and making
participants willing to take further steps together.
Not all of these arguments should lead us to embrace national legislation.
Educating the public regarding the dangers of climate change is a positive
action. If the public underestimates either the probability or the extent of
climate change harms, then educating both the general public and industry is an
uncomplicated benefit to better policymaking. If there is a danger to this
mechanism, however, it is linking the dangerous effects of climate change to the
idea that national legislation will address the problem. As Cary Coglianese and
Jocelyn D’Ambrosio argue with regard to the influence of state regulation on
the popular demand for federal regulation, noncomprehensive measures can
lull the public into believing that meaningful legislation has been passed and
thus dampen the demand for further action.49 The passage of a national climate
change bill, in isolation, will not solve the problem of climate change, but the
public may believe either that the necessary action has been taken or that the
public has done its share to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the United
States, for example, citizens may feel that their state has taken an important step
and now it is up to others (perhaps China) to continue the progress. Therefore,
rather than energizing the public to demand greater action, national-level
legislation can be a stumbling block to an international agreement, leading to
public complacency about climate change.
In addition, the public’s experience with national climate change regulation
may not be positive. In the context of American legislation, the costs of
greenhouse gas regulation are still unknown. High energy costs could erode
public support for environmental regulation. The benefits of climate change
mitigation may also be difficult for the public to observe. Unlike with clean air
or water legislation, there are no local climate change benefits to reducing
greenhouse gases for voters to observe. In the news media, the public is likely to
48.

The Sierra Club and the United Steelworkers have created the Blue Green
Alliance. See Steven Greenhouse, Millions of Jobs of a Different Collar, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 26, 2008, at SPG1.

49.

Coglianese & D’Ambrosio, supra note 42, at 1425 (“[I]ncremental policies may lull
the public into thinking climate change is being addressed, thus dampening
demand for the costly and comprehensive policies that will achieve the most
meaningful results. In the wake of a proliferation of incremental policies,
comprehensive solutions must garner additional support in order to overcome
bias toward the status quo.”).
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still hear that the dangers of climate change are imminent, both because of
carbon leakage and because the current legislative proposals will produce few
short-term benefits (even if carbon leakage is zero). These factors, alone or in
combination, could push public opinion in unexpected directions, making the
public enthusiastic for, or cynical about, future regulation. It could lead to
greater demand for greenhouse gas limitations. Alternatively, it could make the
public skeptical about the benefits of further regulation.50
Lastly, political coalitions between industry and environmental groups for
national-level legislation may prove fleeting. Industry groups may support an
international agreement on climate change, particularly if the industry has
green energy supplies or low-energy production processes to export. But some
industries’ support may stop at the water’s edge. If industry groups supported
national legislation for protectionist benefits (such as a carbon tariff) or to
avoid stricter international regulation, then these alliances may be quite fragile.
For instance, a domestic cap-and-trade system that provides carbon-heavy
producers with free carbon permits could entrench resistance to an
international agreement that would not similarly provide free permits. Support
for the domestic-level measure by industry can be a strategic move to establish a
level of national regulation that satisfies public demands to take action on
climate change but avoids more stringent global regulation. Environmental
groups may overinvest political capital in national legislation and industry
alliances. If the ultimate goal is to secure an international agreement,
environmental groups may not be able to rely on the industry relationships that
they cultivated for national-level regulations, as such support may erode as
regulatory costs increase.
In the end, some incremental measures may move us closer to a solution
for climate change, while other measures may make the path to an international
agreement more difficult.51 The crucial question is how these incremental
measures influence domestic support (at home and abroad) for an international
agreement. Although there may be a natural feeling that something must be
done about the problem of climate change, not all national-level measures will
produce dynamic benefits. To be clear, this is not to say that the United States
should not pass climate change legislation. The dangers of global warming are
real, and the United States needs to be part of the global solution. The nation’s
goal must be to pass legislation that produces positive dynamic effects.
Adopting legislation with negative dynamic effects can be worse than doing
nothing at all. This project seeks to provide a framework for analyzing the
50.

Id. (“[T]he failures of incremental climate change policies might breed increased
cynicism about whether any policy solution can work. When small commitments
fail to produce large policy pay-offs, policies can become harder, not easier, to
expand.”).

51.

For opposing viewpoints on incremental measures, see Freeman & Guzman, supra
note 4 (arguing in favor of U.S. unilateral action even without action by other
states); and Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600-01 (noting the minimal or
zero effect of U.S. unilateral action).
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positive and negative feedback effects of national-level measures. By better
understanding what measures provide a basis for greater support for an
international agreement, and what measures are likely to be pitfalls, we can
better analyze which legislative proposals are worth pursuing.
II. National Regulatory Efforts
This Part argues that national climate change legislation cannot provide a
solution to the problem of climate change in the absence of an international
agreement. It explains why this is true of both national action in isolation and a
series of uncoordinated national actions undertaken by multiple states. Section
II.A discusses the global nature of climate change as well as how carbon leakage
undermines national regulation. Section II.B explains how uncoordinated
action by many states is also highly unlikely to produce sustainable levels of
greenhouse gas emissions. States have vastly different views of what a fair
division of greenhouse gas emissions between nations would be. A series of
uncoordinated national measures is better than nothing (so long as levels of
carbon leakage are sufficiently low), but these uncoordinated actions cannot be
expected to achieve a sustainable level of global emissions. Even with national
legislation, an effective solution to the problem of climate change requires an
international agreement. Thus, if the ultimate goal is to provide the public good
of mitigating global warming, the critical issue for evaluating the usefulness of
national regulation is its ability to aid international negotiations.
A. National Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The planet’s atmosphere is a public good, and climate change constitutes a
public bad.52 Climate change is “public” in that it works on a global scale.53
There is only one atmosphere, which all nations share. Greenhouse gases
produced anywhere on the globe circulate throughout the world.54 Even though
52.

See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244-45
(1968); see also David Archer, Global Warming: Understanding the
Forecast 169-72 (2007) (discussing how global warming is a tragedy of the
commons on a global scale); William D. Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming
the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 3 (2000) (same); Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 162-66 (2006) (same).

53.

See Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime
Failure, 47 Nat. Resources J. 195 (2007) (applying Mancur Olson’s theory of
collective action to climate change); John K. Setear, Learning To Live with Losing:
International Environmental Law in the New Millennium, 20 Va. Envtl. L.J. 139
(2001) (discussing the complexities of global public goods and the difficulty of
reaching an international agreement).

54.

See Richard T. Wright, Environmental Science: Toward a Sustainable
Future 546-47 (9th ed. 2005) (explaining the greenhouse gas effect and the fact
that climate depends on the Earth’s overall concentration of greenhouse gases).
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climate change will have varying effects on different parts of the world,55 all
nations will be affected by climate change regardless of whether they have
produced greenhouse gases or not.56 As China’s lead climate negotiator, Yu
Qingtai, stated: “Not a single country in the world will be able to stay out of
trouble. . . . Not a single country can say that it can keep safe and intact from
global warming.”57
Because the world’s atmosphere is a global commons, the benefits of
climate change mitigation efforts undertaken by one state are not reaped
locally.58 The benefits of that state’s efforts are available to all users of the
planet’s atmosphere, regardless of whether those users are contributing to the
mitigation efforts.59 That state also cannot enclose the commons and thus
exclude others from profiting from the state’s investment. Greenhouse gases
circulate freely throughout the globe, so any decrease in greenhouse gases made
in one location cannot be captured as a climate benefit to that location.60
Consequently, the political process for dealing with global greenhouse gas
pollution is very different from that for dealing with local pollution. Citizens of
the territory producing the greenhouse gases do not internalize fully the costs of
the pollution that they are producing because the harms of greenhouse gas
pollution are partly borne outside of the polluting jurisdiction. In addition, the
national government will not fully internalize the benefits of greenhouse gas
mitigation efforts, because only part of the mitigation’s benefits will be reaped
within the jurisdiction. If the public demands regulation such that the costs of
greenhouse gas reduction are equal to the benefits, then the demand for
unilateral greenhouse gas reduction will be too low to support sufficiently
robust regulations.61
55.

See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 52, at 82 (discussing the disparate health
impacts of global warming).

56.

For a map illustrating the worldwide impact of climate change on physical and
biological systems and surface temperatures, see Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 32 fig.1.2 (2007)
[hereinafter IPCC Report], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.

57.

See Michael Wines, China Sees Progress on Climate Accord, but Resists an Emissions
Ceiling, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2009, at A8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

58.

See Archer, supra note 52, at 169-72.

59.

See Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 162-66.

60.

Roberta Mann, Waiting To Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1135, 1144-45 (2002) (discussing global warming as a tragedy of the
commons); Frederick A.B. Meyerson, Population, Development and Global
Warming: Averting the Tragedy of the Climate Commons, 19 Population & Env’t
443 (1998); Hugh Ward, Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons, 37 J.
Conflict Resol. 203 (1993) (discussing global warming as a tragedy of the
commons where collective action is blocked by national interests).

61.

Stavins, National Climate Change Policy, supra note 3.
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National-level efforts are undermined further by carbon leakage.62 When
one jurisdiction imposes environmental regulations on its local producers, the
effect is one of raising production costs in that jurisdiction and causing more
production to occur in jurisdictions with lower regulation.63 As a result of
carbon leakage—the migration of greenhouse-gas-heavy production processes
to low-regulation jurisdictions—the ultimate global effect of local measures
cannot be judged only on the level of reduction of greenhouse gas production
in the local jurisdiction. Rather, it must include an analysis of whether the local
measure increases or decreases worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.64 The
possibility of carbon leakage has led Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein to suggest
that unilateral reduction of greenhouse gases by the United States would have
“little effect on overall climate change.”65
Leakage can occur in two ways.66 First, and most obviously, factories can
relocate to the low-regulation state.67 The decision of the firm here is economic,
taking into account the cost differences between producing in a high-regulation
state versus a low-regulation state. Second, even without plant relocation,
carbon leakage can occur through pricing.68 If a jurisdiction imposes
environmental regulation, the regulation will raise the price of the good, and
the demand for the local good will decrease. Producers of the same good in
jurisdictions with low environmental regulation can expand their production
and increase their exports of the lower-cost good abroad.69 Such would be the
case with the production of American and Chinese steel. If the United States
imposes environmental regulations on the American steel companies, which
raises the cost of steel production, then demand for American steel at home and
abroad will decrease. If China does not also impose higher environmental
standards, then Chinese steel companies can expand their production of steel
domestically and then export more steel abroad. As a result, the level of carbon62.

Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon
Leakage, 65 J. Int’l Econ. 421 (2004); Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change:
The Case for Unilateral Trade Measures To Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 Geo.
L.J. 2499 (1996); Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices To Protect the Planet, 19
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 515 (2009).

63.

See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677, 692-93 (1999).

64.

Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate
Policy: Beyond Kyoto 83-94 (2003).

65.

Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600-01 (2008).

66.

Wiener, supra note 42, at 1967-73; see also Trevor Houser et al., Leveling the
Carbon Playing Field: International Compensation and US Climate
Policy Design 2-10 (2008).

67.

Wiener, supra note 42, at 1967-68.

68.

Id.

69.

Id.
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intensive production processes can increase in low-regulation states even
without factory relocation.70
Carbon leakage is important to any analysis of national climate change
measures because lower greenhouse gas emissions may lead to increased
greenhouse gas emissions in another jurisdiction.71 The extent of the leakage is
an empirical question, but we know what the relevant factors are for answering
this question.72 One would need to consider the percentage of the carbonintensive production that will move to a different jurisdiction (through either
factory relocation or the price effect) and whether production in the lowregulation state is dirtier, cleaner, or the same as in the first one.73 It is possible
that local environmental measures will result in globally lower greenhouse gas
emissions, higher emissions, or no difference whatsoever.74 In the absence of a
comprehensive international agreement, the actions of one nation to decrease
its greenhouse gases will not necessarily result in lower worldwide levels of
greenhouse gas emissions.
National-level measures are appealing because governments can implement
these measures without an international consensus on how to construct a
comprehensive solution.75 If each state determines what its fair share of global
greenhouse emissions should be, however, levels of greenhouse gases will be far
above sustainable levels. This is not because of the bad intentions of any one
state (or group of states) but because of different conceptions of what each
state’s fair share of global emissions is. While uncoordinated national-level
measures might slow the rate of greenhouse gas emissions below what the rate
would be with no national-level legislation at all, states tend to view their
current rates of emissions (and even increased rates of emissions) as their fair
share of global carbon emissions. As a consequence, national measures can only
be interim steps to a global climate change solution.

70.

Id.

71.

Wiener, supra note 63, at 692-93.

72.

Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2-10.

73.

Id.

74.

Babiker, supra note 62, at 441-43.

75.

This is not to say that states (or the citizens within states) do not or should not
have some moral obligation to undertake greenhouse gas reductions on a national
level. What is morally required depends on one’s moral philosophy. The
argument here is that as a consequential matter, national regulation is not an
effective means to ensure a globally sustainable level of greenhouse gas emissions.
This argument has implications for moral requirements, though, if morality
requires us to be concerned with the direct and indirect effects of our actions.
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B. The Ineffectiveness of Uncoordinated National Policies
The difficulties in regulating greenhouse gases through national legislation
remain even if many states decide to adopt domestic measures to curb
greenhouse gas emissions. There is broad agreement among governments that
climate change is happening and that it will lead to extreme environmental and
economic results.76 Yet there is no agreement on what criteria should inform
the regulation of the planet’s atmosphere going forward.77 For example, should
a state’s past contribution to the current stock of greenhouse gases factor into
the analysis? What about a state’s level of development or population?
Governments appear willing to bear a proportionate cost of solving the
problem,78 but what is a proportionate burden itself depends on what each state
considers the relevant criteria of a fair regulatory scheme to be.79 Among
nations, there are widely divergent views of how to divide global greenhouse
emissions, which current international law does not resolve.80 As a result, the
76.

See IPCC Report, supra note 56, at 2 (stating that the existence of global warming
is “unequivocal” and that most of the temperature increase is “very likely” due to
human activity); see also Wright, supra note 54, at 551-59 (noting scientific
consensus that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and will persist with
significant effects).

77.

See Anil Agarwal, Ctr. for Sci. & the Envt., Making the Kyoto Protocol
Work: Ecological and Economic Effectiveness and Equity in the
Climate Regime 11-12 (2000); Ambuj D. Sagar, Wealth, Responsibility, and
Equity: Exploring an Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions, 45 Climate
Change 511, 512 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and
China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas
Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675 (2008); Sven Bode, Equal Emissions per Capita over
Time—A Proposal To Combine Responsibility and Equity Rights (Hamburg Inst. of
Int’l Econ., Discussion Paper No. 253, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=477281.

78.

Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization 14-43 (2002).

79.

See Daniel Bodansky, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, International
Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (2004), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/2012%20new.pdf (discussing over forty
different approaches to dividing global greenhouse gases).

80.

Neither of the two existing multilateral agreements addressing climate change
provides a roadmap of how to achieve a sustainable level of greenhouse gases. The
first major climate change agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), commits all Member States to address climate
change issues but does not include any concrete emissions targets. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part
II)/Add.1, 31 I.L.M. 849 (May 9, 1992). States can continue with their usual
production of greenhouse gases and be in compliance with the treaty. There is
near universal ratification of this agreement, arguably because the treaty imposes
no real costs on governments. Jana von Stein, The International Law and Politics of
Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the
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alternative to an international agreement—uncoordinated national action—
will not be an effective means of addressing global warming. A series of
uncoordinated national regulations will be better than no regulation (if carbon
leakage levels are sufficiently low), but it will not provide a lasting solution to
the dangers of climate change. This is not because any one nation has bad
motives or is free-riding. Rather, if each government acts on its own conception
of its fair level of emissions, then global emissions will be above sustainable
levels.
In this debate, there are no neutral principles. Even non-nation-based
regulations, such as establishing a global uniform tax on all greenhouse gas
emissions or a global cap-and-trade system, are controversial.81 A uniform tax

Kyoto Protocol, 52 J. Conflict Resol. 243, 244, 248 (2008) (explaining how
countries could join the UNFCCC without fear of violating the agreement
because the treaty did not create sufficient concrete incentives for countries to
improve their behavior). The next major agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, builds
on the UNFCCC treaty and imposes an obligation on developed states to reduce
emission levels using a current-levels dividing principle. Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, arts. 3-8, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7.Add.1, 37 I.L.M 22 (Dec. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol]. Developed countries, defined as those states identified in Annex I, have
an obligation to reduce emissions from a year 1990 baseline. Kyoto Protocol art. 3.
The list includes Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Developing countries, identified in Annex II, have no specific obligations to
reduce greenhouse gases at all. Kyoto Protocol art. 10. Going forward, engaging
developing states in climate change mitigation is critical to achieving a viable
solution. China has become the largest greenhouse gas producer; thus, a
comprehensive treaty regime cannot exclude China from any obligations. Yet,
unsurprisingly, extending the Kyoto Protocol’s current-levels dividing principle to
developing countries is a nonstarter for developing countries. See Agarwal, supra
note 77, at 3. Most notably, China and India have rejected the model of the Kyoto
Protocol as the basis for a multilateral regime that could be expanded to include
all major greenhouse gas producers. See Mark Landler, Event Shows U.S.-India
Split on Climate, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2009, at A6. These governments argue that
Kyoto’s dividing principle is unacceptable when applied to developing states
because it does not allow developing countries to industrialize by “dirty” means
(as the Annex I countries did), and it does not hold the developed world
accountable for the decades of emissions that have created the current stock of
greenhouse gases. Id.
81.

Cédric Philibert, Lessons from the Kyoto Protocol: Implications for the Future, 5
Int’l Rev. Envtl. Strategies 311, 316 (2004) (noting that “[a]t the international
level, uniform tax rates are required for reasons of cost-effectiveness, but the
resulting distribution of costs may be unacceptable, especially by developing
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or uniform market price assumes that all producers of greenhouse gases should
pay the same amount for their emissions. Advocates from developing countries
argue that developed countries industrialized when there was no tax and thus
have gained the advantage of development for free.82 They argue that emissions
from developing countries should be taxed at a lower level than those from
developed states. Policymakers in developed states who worry that such lower
tax rates would put their industries at a competitive disadvantage oppose this
approach.83
There are wide and significant differences among nations’ views of how to
regulate the planet’s atmosphere.84 The fight is largely distributional: How
much should each state have to contribute to mitigation efforts? This Section
reviews three different approaches to distributing the costs of global greenhouse
gas regulation. The Section discusses these approaches to demonstrate the
heterogeneity of views concerning who should bear the costs of mitigating
climate change. Recognizing the wide difference between states’ approaches to
reducing greenhouse gas emission is critical to understanding why a series of
unilateral measures will not be a successful global strategy. Each approach has
significantly different implications for allocating emissions levels among states.
If each state simply adopts its preferred approach, then global greenhouse gases
will quickly surpass sustainable levels. Consequently, governments must reach
an agreement on a coordinated strategy, i.e., a treaty, for there to be a lasting
solution.
The three approaches to greenhouse gas regulation reviewed in this Section
are not the universe of possible approaches. Rather, these three approaches are
representative of the types of concerns that states offer when advocating for
their preferred approach. The three main approaches set different baselines by
which to limit national emission levels. Those baselines are: (1) the state’s
current level of emissions; (2) the state’s historic levels of emissions; and (3) the
state’s level of emissions relative to some domestic measure, such as gross
domestic product or population. Each approach creates a different principle for
dividing use rights to the global commons. The goal here is to demonstrate the
wide difference in states’ positions, not to advocate one principle over another.
Industrialized states have endorsed the view that an international
agreement should adopt status quo levels of emissions and reduce emission

countries, likely to ask for side-payments” and that these issues would make a
global tax extremely difficult).
82.

J. Timmons Roberts & Bradley C. Parks, Ecologically Unequal Exchange, Ecological
Debt, and Climate Justice: The History and Implications of Three Related Ideas for a
New Social Movement, 50 Int’l J. Comp. Soc. 385, 388 (2009) (describing the view
that the developing world is owed an “ecological debt” by industrialized nations
and discussing the development of a “climate justice” movement expressed by the
G-77 and China at UNFCCC negotiations).

83.

Id.

84.

See Bodansky, supra note 79.
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levels from this baseline.85 This dividing principle thus gives precedence to the
state’s current level of emissions. This is the approach of the Kyoto Protocol for
commitments by developed states and the approach of current United States
legislative proposals. Whatever the state’s level of emissions was in a chosen
year—the year 1990 for the Kyoto Agreement (only with regard to developed
states) and the year 2005 for the Lieberman-Warner bill (for all states)—
becomes the standard from which the state must progressively decrease
emissions levels.86 On one side, this seems to be an intuitive bargaining
principle: There is a global problem, and all states (or all developed states for
the Kyoto Protocol) need to take steps to decrease their greenhouse gas
emissions by some roughly equal rate. To the extent that we think international
bargaining includes a status quo bias, this approach is cognitively appealing
because it requires the least deviation from current practice.87 Yet it is also an
odd principle because it is the opposite of the “polluter pays” rule.88 Rather than
having an obligation to contribute more to the mitigation efforts, countries
retain greater rights to emit if they have been significant emitters in the past.
Developing states have resisted the idea that 1990 emissions levels or current
emissions levels should be used as a baseline to reduce emissions globally. The
Chinese and Indian governments, in particular, have been vocal in criticizing
the current levels of emissions standard as one that would make it more
difficult to raise living standards in already poor countries.89
In stark contrast with the current level of emissions standard, the “climate
debt” or historic levels of emissions standard focuses on which states have

85.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 80, art. 3, para. 1 (obligating Annex I countries to
reduce emissions by varying amounts below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012).

86.

Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., tit. I,
§ 1201. The text places a ceiling on the total emissions allowances granted by the
bill to covered entities. These goals are based on 2005 levels, mandating reductions
of 4% by 2012, 19% by 2020, and 71% by 2050. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 80, art. 3,
para. 1.

87.

See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. Risk & Uncertainty 7 (1988).

88.

Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 175 (“[N]o one has really provided a reasoned defense
of the premise underlying Kyoto.”); see also Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Principle 16, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 14,
1992) (“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with
due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.”).

89.

See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600 (discussing the Chinese government’s
demand that climate change mitigation efforts not restrict its ability to develop);
Landler, supra note 80.
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caused the current environmental harm.90 Under this approach, developed
states have created the global warming crisis and, thus, should bear the financial
burdens of keeping emissions within sustainable levels. Much closer to the
polluter pays principle, this approach is supported largely by states that are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change: island nations, states
with low-lying cities, and states that do not have the wealth or technology to
adapt to new climate patterns. It is not the mirror image of the current levels
approach, however, because recent major emitters (namely China and India)
would not have the same obligation to reduce emissions radically. Advocates of
the climate debt approach to dividing emissions rights generally demand that
developed nations make drastic cuts in their emissions levels—decreases of 40%
to 50% of 1990 levels—by 2020.91 As one would expect, policymakers in the
developed world reject this approach as requiring too sweeping a change from
the status quo.92
Other standards have been put forward that would link the states’
emissions rights to national measures.93 These standards embody a no-fault
principle as to past greenhouse gas contributions by dividing emissions by
metrics such as gross national product (GNP) or population size. The GNP
measure tends to favor developed states, which have higher levels of production
and is opposed by developing states, which argue that limiting a state’s
emissions rights is de facto limiting its means of development (and thus reifying
the current levels approach). The per capita approach favors developing states
that already have low per capita rates of greenhouse gas emissions. The per
capita principle is an appealing one if the global atmosphere is considered a
good to which all people should have an equal share. The per capita differences
between states are also striking. In 2006, the average greenhouse gas emission
90.

See Denis McDonough & Rebecca Schultz, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Balancing Our
Climate Debt: The Group of Eight Have an Obligation, June 1, 2007,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/06/g8_climate_debt.html; Posting
of Andrew C. Revkin to DOT EARTH, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/11/10/fresh-demands-from-front-line-states-in-climate-fight/ (Nov. 10, 2009,
10:56 EST).

91.

Posting
of
Elisabeth
Rosenthal
to
DOT
EARTH,
http://
dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/rich-poor-divide-still-stalls-climateaccord/ (Apr. 10, 2009, 10:26 EDT).

92.

Singer, supra note 78, at 14-43; Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 175; see also Rosenthal,
supra note 91 (reporting that developed states consider such a radical revision
absurd).

93.

See Bodansky, supra note 79 (summarizing forty-four different principles); see
also Agarwal, supra note 77, Bode, supra note 77; Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, Should Carbon Emission Be Allocated on a per Capita Basis?, 97 Cal. L.
Rev. 51 (2009) (arguing against this standard); Mathias Risse, Who Should
Shoulder the Burden? Global Climate Change and Common Ownership of the Earth
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No.
RWP08-075, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338257.
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rate per capita in India was 1.16 tons and in China was 4.58 tons.94 By contrast,
the American per capita rate was 19.78 tons, and the German per capita rate was
10.40 tons.95
None of the three approaches outlined here need be adopted in its pure
form. An international agreement can emerge from a mix of these
considerations—for instance, a current levels baseline model with significant
financial and technological transfers to developing states. Nonetheless, states
need to engage one another in international negotiations to reach such an
agreement. Because there is such a wide divergence between the views of
governments on what a “fair” division of greenhouse gases entails, it is highly
unlikely that a consensus will emerge without international talks. A
compromise is reachable but almost certainly will not emerge from a series of
unilateral national-level measures.
In sum, policymakers and academics alike acknowledge that the only means
of successfully addressing the threat of climate change is an international
agreement that includes the major greenhouse gas producers and most of the
potential major greenhouse gas producers. Given the current state of
technology, no one state can provide a clean atmosphere unilaterally, so
collective action is necessary. Although uncoordinated national measures may
succeed in lowering a nation’s greenhouse gas emissions, these measures cannot
assure that worldwide emissions will not be excessive. Only through coordinated
multilateral action, i.e., treaty negotiations, can governments be confident that
any mitigation efforts they take will result in a comprehensive solution to the
dangers of climate change.
III. Analysis of Legislative Proposals
This Part examines four causal narratives of how national legislation can
lead to greater support for an international agreement: (1) that national
legislation directs economic resources to industries that will support an
international agreement; (2) that national legislation demonstrates
international leadership on climate negotiations, which will make an agreement
easier to reach; (3) that industry will demand an international solution rather
than accept a patchwork of national-level standards; and (4) that experience
with a national-level environmental regime will foster a popular constituency
that will demand a more comprehensive solution. It discusses current legislative
proposals as examples of how national legislation can have mixed effects on
international bargaining. It is not intended to be a section-by-section review of
American legislation on climate change (the final form of which has yet to take
shape). Rather, the following discussion illustrates how different legislative

94.

See Union of Concerned Scientists, Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions,
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/eachcountrys-share-of-co2.html (last visited July 1, 2010).

95.

Id.
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provisions can have effects that are both helpful and detrimental to the
conclusion of a comprehensive global warming agreement. In addition, it
discusses legislative provisions as if they are independent, treating the domestic
cap-and-trade program, for instance, separately from the proposal for a carbon
tariff. This approach makes sense because the dynamic effects of each provision
are different. The political reality in Washington may be that these provisions
are linked; legislative support for a cap-and-trade program may be contingent
on the acceptance of trade restrictions on foreign goods. Although a final
legislative proposal may be a package deal politically, this analysis treats the
design elements independently to highlight the dynamic and static effects of
each.
Section III.A details the conventional wisdom that the proposed legislation
is a stepping stone to an international agreement. Sections III.B and III.C
analyze two design elements of the legislative proposals: (1) the proposed
national cap-and-trade system; and (2) the proposed carbon tariff. The capand-trade system has mixed dynamic effects. The most positive effects are the
incentive for low-cost reducers of emissions to cut their emissions significantly,
and the incentive for greater research (at home and abroad) into cleaner
sources of energy. There are some negative dynamic effects, such as the location
of emissions-heavy production processes outside of the regulatory areas. The
most important effect is not immediate carbon leakage, but “political
leakage”—the growth of an industrial sector that has reason to oppose an
international agreement. The second design element, the carbon tariff, also has
mixed effects. Used as a multilateral sanctioning device, i.e., used as part of an
international regime, a carbon tariff can help solve the free-riding and hold-out
problems inherent in an international public goods agreement. Yet when the
carbon tariff is used by one state in isolation, the negative dynamic effects are
significant. When implementing a carbon tariff, a government unilaterally
implements what it believes is an adequate environmental regulation. This can
complicate international bargaining over greenhouse gas reductions and can
distort public opinion about what a “fair” climate change agreement entails.
A. The Value of National Legislation
In the absence of prospects for a comprehensive international agreement in
the near term, national and local governments have turned to domestic-level
legislation to combat climate change.96 Although there are serious questions
about how effective such national or subnational measures will be in addressing
global climate change issues, domestic legislation is politically achievable
without multilateral consensus. Policymakers seeking to satisfy constituent

96.

278

The European Union has established an emissions trading system. See Council
Directive 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive
96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32.
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demands that greenhouse gas emissions should be addressed are looking to
their own legislatures.97
The conventional wisdom among interest groups, policymakers, popular
commentators, and academics is that national climate change legislation is
useful not because of its direct environmental effects but because it puts the
nation on a path to achieving a comprehensive climate change solution. The
United States could not provide the public good of sustainable global levels of
greenhouse gases unilaterally, even if there were the political will to decrease
American greenhouse gas emissions radically (a claim for which there is little
evidence). Consequently, U.S. action needs to be seen in the context of
collective action. The premise behind national-level climate change legislation is
that it will lead to political changes at home and abroad;98 that is, national-level
emissions reductions will create a positive political feedback effect that will spur
other states to alter their emissions levels as well and lead to greater support for
an international agreement.
Discussions of the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security
Act (the climate change bill that passed the House on June 26, 2009) as well as
the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (the Senate bill that failed to pass
in 2008) reflect the accepted wisdom that national legislation will be a building
block to an international agreement.99 Although these climate bills are not
sufficient to solve the problem of climate change, they set the United States on
the path to greater international reductions in carbon emissions, greater
domestic reductions, or both. For instance, President Obama’s support for the
Waxman-Markey Bill is premised on the assumption that it will produce a
political dynamic that will lead to greater emissions reductions in the future.100

97.

In addition to federal measures, there are a variety of state and local climate
change measures. Many states have adopted policies either unilaterally or
regionally. For an accounting of such policies, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate
Change, Climate Change 101: State Action (2009), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-State-Jan09_1.pdf.

98.

Posting of Andrew C. Revkin to DOT EARTH, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes
.com/2009/06/26/the-climate-bill-in-climate-context/ (June 26, 2009, 14:23 EDT)
(“Some longtime opponents of regulatory approaches to climate run the numbers
and show the scant impact of the bill in isolation. Supporters of the bill readily
acknowledge that American action in isolation would be insufficient. But they say
our action would galvanize the globe, including developing countries, to take on
commitments, as well.”).

99.

Kevin Drum, Is Waxman-Markey Worth It?, Mother Jones, July 1, 2009,
http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2009/07/waxman-markey-worth-it (arguing
that the bill is worth passing because it provides the United States with a
framework for more serious action in the future).

100. See Roundtable Interview, supra note 18. Former Vice President Al Gore noted
that “[t]his bill doesn’t solve every problem, . . . but passage today means that we
build momentum for the debate coming up in the Senate and negotiations for the
treaty talks in December which will put in place a global solution to the climate
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President Obama responded to a question regarding European Union leaders’
concerns that emission targets in the Waxman-Markey climate change bill are
too weak by stating:
Now, [Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European Union leaders]
would like to see even more aggressive targets. My argument to her and
to the Europeans is we don’t want to make the best the enemy of the
good . . . . I think legitimately people want the framework in place and
for us to make strong, steady, gradual progress, as opposed to trying to
shoot for the moon and not being able to get anything done. . . . I think
that the Waxman-Markey bill represents a great start.101
Among academic commentators, the consensus is also that unilateral
climate change legislation is a building block to a comprehensive agreement.102
In fact, the vast majority of academic debate has been over whether national
crisis.” John M. Broder, House Backs Bill, 219-212, To Curb Global Warming, N.Y.
Times, June 27, 2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101.

Roundtable Interview, supra note 18.

102. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System To Address
Climate Change, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 293 (2008) (arguing that the United
States needs to adopt a national climate change program); Joseph E. Stiglitz, A
New Agenda for Global Warming, 3 Economists’ Voice 1, 1-4 (2006) (calling on
the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and advocating that other
states impose trade sanctions on the United States if it does not); Freeman &
Guzman, supra note 4, at 62 (“Though international cooperation should be
pursued, the reluctance of others to fully engage the problem is not a sound
reason for inaction by the United States. Whatever others do, the United States
should move aggressively to reduce global GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions.”);
see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap-andTrade, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 21 (2009) (“[T]he United States remains a leading
source of greenhouse gas emissions, and it is unlikely that the developed world
will agree to mandatory reductions in 2012, if the United States has not taken steps
to reduce its emissions before then. The new President and Congress in 2009 face
the imperative of adopting measures to control greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States and thereby establishing American credibility for the international
negotiations on the next climate change treaty.”).
Some commentators argue that unilateral measures should be taken in
coordination with international action. See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 64, at
122-30 (arguing for a two-step program). Under Stewart and Wiener’s framework,
the United States first would adopt a voluntary emissions reductions program to
help it prepare for later emissions reductions. The United States only would adopt
the second step of mandatory reductions when it signed an international
agreement with other major emitters. Id.
This view represents the conventional wisdom, but there are dissenting
voices. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600-01 (arguing that unilateral
action by the United States produces little to no environmental benefit and thus
would not pass a cost-benefit analysis); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 1677 (same).
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legislation should take the form of a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax,
rather than whether national legislation should be undertaken at all.103 A more
limited debate also exists regarding the efficacy of state-level measures as a
means of achieving (the presumably positive step) of uniform federal
legislation.104
Similarly, interest groups have supported national legislation based on the
idea that it is the first step to a more comprehensive solution. The United States
Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), an NGO and industry group that lobbies
on climate change,105 argues that the “U.S. tradition on environmental
103.

The literature is large. See, e.g., Stewart & Wiener, supra note 64 (preferring the
cap-and-trade system); Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 102; Nathaniel O.
Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits To Control U.S.
Greenhouse Gases, 3 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 42 (2009); Joseph E. Aldy &
William A. Pizer, Issues in Designing U.S. Climate Change Policy (Res. for the
Future Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-20.pdf; Gilbert Metcalf & David
Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 254, 2009); Stavins, supra note 102; see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The
Perfect, the Good, the Planet, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2009, at A23 (arguing for a capand-trade system).

104. See Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage in the
USA, in Climate Change and European Emissions Trading: Lessons for
Theory and Practice 225 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008) (arguing
in favor of state-level measures); Carlarne, supra note 36 (same); Coglianese &
D’Ambrosio, supra note 42 (arguing against the utility of state-level measures);
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 36, at 1500 (arguing that state-level measures are
important catalysts for federal regulation); Douglas Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler,
Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1621 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of
establishing a robust state-level carbon trading system given American
constitutional constraints); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law Must Be
Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse
Gas Trading Systems, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1431 (2008) (same); Patrick Parenteau,
Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with Little
Help from Washington, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1453 (2008) (arguing in favor of statelevel measures); Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration
of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1, 18-20
(2007) (providing a framework for states and towns to implement the Kyoto
Protocol without federal action); Wiener, supra note 42 (arguing against the
utility of state-level measures); see also Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax:
Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1827 (2008)
(advocating the use of public nuisance laws to decrease greenhouse gas emissions
within the United States).
105.

USCAP industry members include Alcoa, Dow, Duke Energy, DuPont, the Ford
Motor Company, General Electric, General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, PepsiCo,
Shell, and Siemens. Its NGO members include the Environmental Defense Fund,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Nature Conservancy, and the World
Resources Institute. United States Climate Action Partnership–About Us,
http://www.us-cap.org/about-us (last visited July 1, 2010).
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protection seems to dictate that the most difficult step is the first one . . . . But
we shouldn’t think for a second our job is done once the bill is passed.”106 The
Union of Concerned Scientists, an NGO of environmental scientists, has
supported domestic action, observing that the view among most advocacy
groups involves an agenda through which they work together to strengthen the
bill and ultimately see it enacted, while blocking political initiatives to water it
down. The group added: “We also have to remember that it took many years to
pass the Clean Air Act, which was later significantly strengthened through
various amendments.”107 Even popular commentators have expressed the belief
that the bill, even if flawed, is a step forward.108 Paul Krugman has written that
opponents of Waxman-Markey are “making the perfect the enemy of the
good.”109
In spite of the consensus that national climate legislation is a stepping stone
to a more comprehensive solution, the mechanism for how it will occur is not
fully articulated.110 By more precisely articulating the underlying political logic,
we see that it is far from obvious that the political dynamic is always supportive
of greater environmental regulation. In particular, measures that are positive in
a static sense can be self-defeating in a dynamic sense. This area is one where
the institutional design of the national-level measure matters tremendously. As
this Section demonstrates, however, each of these mechanisms has the potential
to fizzle or even backfire, reducing political support for a comprehensive
multilateral solution. All of these mechanisms can lead to greater support for an
international agreement, but they can also entrench resistance to such an
agreement. In other words, each can cut both ways. It is thus hard to predict
whether national legislation will create greater support for an international
agreement or entrench resistance against it. The framework developed here
106. A Good Start, supra note 46 (statement of Angela Anderson, Program Director for
the U.S. Climate Action Network).
107.

Id. (statement of Liz Martin Perera, Legislative Representative on Climate for the
Union of Concerned Scientists); see also id. (statement of Denis Hayes, Chairman
of the American Solar Energy Society) (“Waxman-Markey’s flaws are huge but
discrete, and they can be addressed in the years ahead.”).

108. Id. (statement of Paul Hawken) (arguing that the Waxman-Markey bill
“represents a direction, not a plan” and expressing the hope that “the bill will
begin to form the basis of a more comprehensive energy strategy”).
109. Krugman, supra note 103.
110.
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The consensus that the Waxman-Markey bill is a step forward to an international
agreement is not unanimous. Most notably, Greenpeace has opposed the
Waxman-Markey bill, stating: “The giveaways and preferences in the bill will
actually spur a new generation of nuclear and coal-fired power plants to the
detriment of real energy solutions. To support such a bill is to abandon the real
leadership that is called for at this pivotal moment in history.” Press Release,
Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey: Climate Bill Not ScienceBased; Benefits Polluters (June 25, 2009), available at http://www.greenpeace
.org/usa/press-center/releases2/greenpeace-opposes-waxman-mark.
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examines how national legislation will influence future political bargaining,
both at home and abroad. Not all national-level measures are worth the
political capital needed for passage. Some are worth pursuing but some are selfdefeating.
B. The Proposed Cap-and-Trade System
1.

The Cap-and-Trade Model

Almost all legislative proposals in the United States involve a cap-and-trade
regime,111 which is a system that imposes a ceiling on the level of emissions and
then establishes a competitive market for the sale of emission rights.112 A capand-trade system essentially privatizes the right to produce greenhouse gas
emissions and turns the right into a tradable commodity.113 This system deprives
industrial producers (such as electricity plants) of the right to produce
unlimited quantities of greenhouse gases. Under such a regime, the electricity
plant would have to present an emissions credit for each unit of greenhouse gas
it produced. If the electricity plant had an insufficient number of credits to
cover its emissions, then it would have to purchase additional credits from
other owners of credits. If the electricity plant had more credits than it needed,
then it could sell its unused credits to other polluters. The process of buying
and selling credits creates a market, where the price of a credit is determined by
the demand and supply of credits.114
Credits can initially be dispensed in a number of ways.115 The government
determines how many total credits will be issued and thus sets a ceiling (or cap)
on the level of greenhouse gas emissions in an industry. These credits can then
be either allocated to industries (for free or for a set price) or sold at auction.
The initial dispensing of credits has significant distributional effects—the
government either gains the revenue from selling the credits at auction or gives
the value of these credits to the industry—but the initial allocation should not
111.

Keohane, supra note 103, at 42.

112.

Brian C. Murray & Heather Holsterman, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and the
Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 699, 707-10 (2009); Robert
N. Stavins, supra note 102, at 296-99; see also Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Proposal Is Best?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
123, 135-138 (2007) (discussing specific legislative proposals).

113.

For a general defense of a pollution rights system versus the alternative
command-and-control system, see Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1335-40 (1985). See also Carol
M. Rose, Hot Spots in the Legislative Climate Change Proposals, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
Colloquy 189, 195 (2008) (describing cap-and-trade systems as creating property
and discussing the political pitfalls of this approach absent sufficient monitoring).

114.

Stavins, supra note 102, at 298-99.

115.

Flatt, supra note 112, at 139-42; Stavins, supra note 102, at 298.
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affect the functioning of the emissions credit market.116 Once the government
has allocated the credits, the price of each credit is determined by market forces,
namely the industry need for more credits to cover its pollution and the
number of excess credits available.117
A cap-and-trade regime, like a standard tax, raises the costs of carbon
pollution. As the price of carbon increases, carbon reduction measures become
more cost-efficient, so industries are more likely to take these measures. Other
sources of energy also become more price-competitive. The promise of
increasing costs on carbon production creates incentives to invest in cleaner
energy sources because there is an expectation that the price of carbon
emissions will continue to grow. All of this is good for the environment.
2.

The Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade System

The Waxman-Markey bill establishes a cap-and-trade system for industries
that are heavy greenhouse gas producers, including electricity producers, oil
refineries, natural gas suppliers, and iron, steel, cement, and paper
manufacturers.118 Starting in 2012, all of these industries would have to present
an emissions credit for each metric ton of carbon dioxide they produce. Other
sources of pollution are brought under the cap by 2016.119 The bill sets a cap for

116.

Stavins, supra note 102, at 317-19.

117.

Id. at 298 (“Regardless of how allowances are distributed initially, the need to
surrender valuable allowances to cover any emissions and the opportunity to
trade those allowances create a price signal for emissions. In turn, this price signal
provides firms with an incentive to reduce emissions that influences their
production and investment decisions. Because allowances are tradable, the
ultimate distribution of emission reduction efforts necessary to meet the overall
emissions cap is determined by market forces.”).
Government action can influence the market in a number of ways. If the
government decides to issue more credits than it initially allocated, then
speculation can drive the price of credits down (because of the fear that there will
be a flood of new supply). Changes in the government’s definition of offsets can
also affect the price of credits by increasing or decreasing the alternatives to
credits.

118.

H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., tit. III, subtit. E, § 312 (2009). For a detailed summary of
the bill, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Pew Center Summary of
H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (WaxmanMarkey) (2009) [hereinafter Pew Center H.R. 2454 Report], available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/waxman-markey-detailed-summaryjuly2009.pdf.

119.

In 2012, the program will cover an estimated 67% of U.S. emissions, while in 2014
it will cover 78% and in 2016 will reach its maximum of 85%. John Larsen &
Robert Heilmayr, World Res. Inst., Emissions Reductions Under the
Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft 4 (2009), http://pdf.wri.org/
usclimatetargets_2009-04-22.pdf.
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greenhouse gas production from these sources based on 2005 levels. Table 3
shows the emissions level goals and the total number of emissions credits
available per year.
Table 3: Waxman-Markey Emissions Schedule120
Year
Cap on emissions, as reduction Number of emissions credits
from 2005 levels
allocated, in billions (each credit
covers one ton of carbon)
2012
3%
4.627
2020
17%
5.056121
2030
42%
3.533
2050
83%
1.035
In addition, the Waxman-Markey bill provides for offsets, which are credits
for activities that decrease carbon levels, such as reforestation or preventing
deforestation.122 If an industry supports such an activity, then the industry can
reduce the number of emissions credits that it needs to cover its pollution. As
an example, assume that an electricity plant produces 100,000 tons of carbon
dioxide per year. After 2012, the plant would have to provide 100,000 emissions
credits to the government per year. If the electricity plant pays to put a forest
under conservation (so the trees could not be harvested) and this is determined
to capture 20,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions, then the electricity
plant would have to present only 80,000 emissions credits for that year.
Under the Waxman-Markey bill, polluters can claim up to two billion
metric tons of carbon dioxide per year from offsets.123 Offsets are not included
120. H.R. 2454, tit. III, subtit. A, § 311.
121.

The number of emissions credits increases from 2012 to 2020 (in spite of the fact
that carbon emissions are supposed to be lower by 2020) because the law
progressively covers more entities.

122.

See Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal
“Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 Minn.
J. L. Sci. & Tech. 591, 604-10 (2009); Flatt, supra note 112, at 142-45; Murray &
Holsterman, supra note 112, at 711-15; James L. Olmstead, Carbon Dieting: Latent
Ancillary Rights to Carbon Offsets in Conservation Easements, 29 J. Land
Resources & Envtl. L. 121, 122-24 (2009); Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest
Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. Int’l
L. & Com. Reg. 851, 858-71 (2009); see also Elizabeth Rosenthal, In Brazil, Paying
Farmers To Let the Trees Stand, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing such
programs in Brazil and raising questions about these programs’ effectiveness).

123.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), rather than the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), determines what qualifies as an offset. Granting the
offset authority to the USDA has been criticized because this agency does not have
expertise in valuing carbon dioxide emissions. See Allison Winter, Farm Groups
Prevail as House Climate Bill Puts USDA in Charge of Ag Offsets, Env’t & Energy
Daily, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/
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in the national emissions cap. Thus, the actual level of U.S. carbon emissions
per year is two billion tons higher than the scheduled amount. For instance, in
2012, covered industries will actually be able to emit up to 6.627 billion tons of
carbon dioxide rather the published cap of 4.627 billion tons. Finally, the
Waxman-Markey bill distributes emissions credits on a mixed free allocation
and auction system. That is, when the government grants the yearly level of
emissions credits, the government provides some of the credits at no cost to
industry or public entities (including states) and sells the rest at a competitive
price.124 These allocations are scaled back over time.125
3. The Effect of the Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade System on
International Negotiations
Imposing a cap-and-trade regime domestically directs economic resources
toward industries in the United States that will have a greater incentive to
support an international agreement. This happens for three reasons. First, U.S.
industries that have to pay the carbon tax (directly through emissions credits or
indirectly through higher electricity prices) will want other countries to have
the same restrictions. Second, if the United States develops cleaner energy
sources, these clean energy industries will want to expand the market for their
products by raising environmental standards abroad. Third, and possibly most
importantly, if there is innovation in the clean energy market, it has the
potential to lessen the costs of addressing climate change, nationally and
internationally. Innovation eases the distributional problem at the international
level and makes an agreement easier to accept. These positive feedback effects
are significant in developing support for an international agreement. As these
effects are well-recognized in the academic and political press, this Subsection
does not expand on them other than to emphasize the magnitude of the
positive effects (particularly the innovation element).
On the economic reallocation downside, there are two main effects. First,
there will be some carbon leakage to other states—some industries will shift
production to other countries based on a number of factors such as tax rates,
labor markets, the stability of the legal system, international barriers to trade,
and transportation costs. On the margin, higher regulatory prices at home
encourage relocation abroad. In the static analysis, this means that overall
carbon emissions may increase. More important is the dynamic political effect
of this leakage. If high-emissions industries move to developing countries, then
we are changing the economic structure of those nations through selection

06/24/24climatewire-farm-groups-prevail-as-house-climate-bill-pu-24287.html
(describing the debate over whether the EPA or the USDA should run the
program and noting environmental groups’ preference for the EPA).
124.

See Pew Center H.R. 2454 Report, supra note 118, at app. A (summarizing the
allocation of emissions allowances).

125.

Id.
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effects. Those economies may become more dependent on high carbon
emissions and, worse, these industries may have greater political influence in
developing states than they do in industrialized states. We might call this
“political leakage.” Although the cap-and-trade system increases demand in the
United States for an international agreement, political leakage may decrease
support for one in developing countries. In addition, the expectation that
developing countries will progressively benefit from more relocation as the
United States imposes gradually stricter environmental regulations makes the
developing states want to remain open to the relocation of high-emissions
industries.
It is unclear how much of the current impasse between the developed and
developing countries observed at the G8 and the Copenhagen climate
negotiations is a result of exactly these effects from EU regulations. Although
the extent of current carbon leakage from EU emissions reductions is hard to
determine (estimates range from as low as 5% to as high as 130%126), the
expectation that developing countries can gain a competitive advantage from
unilateral actions by developed states can decrease their support for an
international agreement that includes their greenhouse gas emissions.
The primary noneconomic rationale for the Waxman-Markey bill is to
establish U.S. leadership in international climate change negotiations. The view
that the bill will signal leadership to the international community is widespread
in the popular press. The Pew Center on Climate Change argues that:
[t]he future of the international climate effort hinges in large measure
on the United States, which as the world’s largest economy and
cumulative emitter of greenhouse gases, has both the capacity and the
responsibility to lead. Other major emitters are unlikely to commit to
stronger action without the United States.127
USCAP, the industry-environmentalist coalition, has also long argued that U.S.
leadership is necessary for an international agreement on climate change and
thus the United States needs to take domestic action to cut emissions, even if
other nations do not take such action.128
126.

See Babiker, supra note 62 (citing other studies that claim leakage rates are as low
as 5% but finding that leakage could be as high as 130%).

127.

Pew Ctr. on Climate Change, Climate Change 101: International Action
7 (2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-IntlJan09.pdf.

128.

U.S. Climate Action P’ship, A Blueprint for Legislative Action:
Consensus Recommendations for U.S. Climate Protection Legislation 3
(2009), available at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf (“USCAP
believes that international action is essential to meeting the climate challenge. U.S.
leadership is essential for establishing an equitable and effective international
policy framework for robust action by all major emitting countries. USCAP
believes that adoption of mandatory U.S. climate policy is an essential
precondition for a full and effective international framework. The mechanism
that Congress establishes as part of U.S. climate legislation can play a crucial role
287

Article - Rachel Brewster - 23 - Final - 2010.07.01

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

7/6/2010 9:31:53 AM

28 : 245

2010

Environmental groups’ support for the Waxman-Markey bill was explicitly
linked to the international signal that the legislation would have.129 Earthjustice
supported the Waxman-Markey legislation, arguing that the “bill would
provide needed momentum for an international climate agreement.”130 The
Environmental Defense Fund described the legislation as historic because it
places the United States in “a new position of leadership in the global effort to
protect the climate.”131 The bill’s detractors also explained their resistance in
terms of the expected international effects. Greenpeace opposed the bill’s
“retreat from aggressive targets” because “[t]his legislation sends a strong and
unmistakable signal to the world that the United States is not yet ready to show
the leadership necessary to reach a strong agreement at Copenhagen in
December [2009].”132 The World Wildlife Fund expressed its view that the
Waxman-Markey bill “falls short of what is needed to achieve a global
agreement to manage climate change” and “[u]nless strengthened, this bill
could undermine America’s ability to secure an effective international
agreement.”133 The key issue here is a comparative analysis of different signals:
in encouraging broad international action. However, U.S. action to implement
mandatory measures and incentives for reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions
should not be contingent on simultaneous action by other countries.”).
129.

See A Good Start, supra note 46 (statement of Joseph Romm, Senior Fellow at the
Center for American Progress) (noting that if the United States does not take any
legislative action then “[s]erious U.S. action would be off the table for years, the
effort to jumpstart the clean-energy economy in this country would stall, the
international negotiating process would fall apart, . . . any chance of a deal with
China would be dead[, and w]arming of 5 degrees C or more by century’s end
would be all but inevitable”). The Climate Group, a European environmental
organization, agrees, noting that with the legislation, “the Obama Administration
would have a domestically valid basis from which to negotiate international
reduction targets in Copenhagen [in December 2009].” Press Release, Climate
Group, Waxman-Markey Bill: Despite Compromises, A “Major Step in the Right
Direction” (May 22, 2009), available at http://www.theclimategroup.org/ournews/news/2009/5/22/waxmanmarkey-bill-despite-compromises-a-major-step-inthe-right-direction/.

130.

Press Release, Earthjustice, Earthjustice Thanks Chairmen Waxman and Markey
for Leadership on Combating Climate Change (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/2009/earthjustice-thanks-chairmenwaxman-and-markey-for-leadership-on-combating-climate-change.html.

131.

Press Release, Environmental Defense Fund, Statement of EDF President Fred
Krupp on House Passage of the American Clean Energy and Security Act (June
26, 2009), available at http://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?contentID=10049.

132.

Press Release, Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey (June 25,
2009), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/releases2/
greenpeace-opposes-waxman-mark.

133.

Press Release, World Wildlife Fund, World Wildlife Fund Statement on the
American Clean Energy and Security Act (May 14, 2009), available at
http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2009/WWFPresitem12397.html.
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no national legislation, unambitious national legislation, and ambitious
national legislation. Certainly, the bill demonstrates that the United States
recognizes that global warming is a real environmental phenomenon that can
lead to devastating consequences. This posture is arguably a change from
United States policy that did not actively deny the existence of climate change
but undertook little effort to decrease carbon emissions. Yet it is hard to argue
that the acknowledgement of climate change is leadership.
Leadership involves both willingness to cooperate and the terms on which
one will cooperate. The Waxman-Markey bill signals to the international
community a willingness to reduce carbon emissions but also may signal the
lack of political support for dramatic cuts. The current Waxman-Markey bill
has been criticized from numerous sources for being insufficiently ambitious,
particularly in the short term.134 The United States has adopted modest goals for
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions (17% of 2005 levels by 2020) and very
liberal policies for carbon offsets (meaning that the actual cut in emissions will
be much lower than 17%).135 The rest of the world may see this as a statement
that the United States is unwilling to shoulder much of the cost of climate
change mitigation. Even with a Democratic President and Democratic control
of both houses of Congress, the United States appears unable to adopt
ambitious measures.
The crucial question here is how the signal will be interpreted compared to
other signals. If the United States government fails to adopt any climate change
legislation, then this failure would obviously be a worse signal. Beyond failing to
lead, inaction would indicate that the United States is simply unwilling to
engage in significant reductions of greenhouse gas pollution. The WaxmanMarkey bill is an improvement over no action, yet it highlights a lack of political
In the same vein, Congressman Dennis Kucinich of Ohio voted against the bill
because the proposal did not go far enough to decrease emissions and thus
“undermines our bargaining position in international negotiations in
Copenhagen and beyond.” Kucinich argues that “[a]s the biggest per capita
polluter, we have a responsibility to take action that is disproportionately stronger
than the actions of other countries.” Press Release, Rep. Dennis Kucinich,
Kucinich: “Passing a Weak Bill Today Gives Us Weak Environmental Policy
Tomorrow” (June 26, 2009), available at http://kucinich.house.gov/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134813.
134.

Broder & Kanter, supra note 35 (reporting on Europe’s pleasure with the Obama
Administration’s seriousness regarding climate change but displeasure with
American short-term goals to reduce emissions); Greenpeace, supra note 132.

135.

H.R. 2454, tit. III, subtit. A, § 311 (2009); see Stephan Power, Impact of ‘Offsets’ To
Reduce Emissions Is Uncertain, Wall St. J., June 27, 2009, at A2 (describing how
two billion tons of the proposed reductions in greenhouse gas emissions could
come from the offset system rather than current polluters); see also Posting of
James Kanter to Green, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/docarbon-offsets-cause-emissions-to-rise/ (May 8, 2009, 6:50 EDT) (discussing
research that suggests offsets do not lead to emission reductions and are difficult
to verify).
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will to lead in climate change negotiations. The bill signals that the United
States is willing to curb greenhouse gas emissions but only to levels that would
still allow the country to be among the planet’s largest polluters, particularly
over the next decade. Thus the bill may be a step toward an international
agreement in that it demonstrates the willingness of the United States to engage
in carbon emissions reductions, but it may simultaneously be a stumbling block
as it announces how the United States expects to cooperate. This may be an
advantageous bargaining position for the United States in terms of minimizing
costs if an agreement is reached (by attempting to credibly signal that the
United States will not bear more than a certain share of the common costs), but
it also increases the likelihood that no international agreement will be
reached.136
The third mechanism, creating a patchwork of regulations that inhibits
interstate or international trade, is not one that comes into play in the cap-andtrade system. Unlike the California legislation that threatened to raise fuel
economy standards for automobiles sold in California, the Waxman-Markey
bill does not impose product standards, but rather taxes the carbon emissions
in the manufacturing process.137 That is, the bill does not regulate carbon
emissions by banning the sale of end products that do not meet certain fueleconomy standards. For instance, American and foreign car companies are free
to continue to sell SUVs and trucks that get relatively poor gas mileage on the
American market.138 As a result, there is no political rationale for manufacturers
to demand uniform regulation at a higher government level (here, the
international level). The bill permits the imposition of a carbon tariff on
imported goods by 2020 (a design element that this Article addresses next) but
only on goods from countries that have inadequate environmental regulations
on the manufacturing process.139
The process of passing domestic legislation also raises public awareness of
the problem of climate change. This can lead the public to change its beliefs
about what needs to be done to address the issue. If the legislation makes the
problem of climate change more salient or makes the public willing to shoulder
a larger portion of the cost of an international agreement, then the legislation is
a step forward. The cap-and-trade system can also build greater support among
the public for additional environmental legislation by demonstrating that the
legislation carries good value. If the public sees the benefits of the regulation
and observes that the economic costs are low, then the public might demand
136.

See Putnam, supra note 5.

137.

See H.R. 2454, tit. III, subtit. A, § 311.

138.

Interestingly, the bill does prohibit individual states from imposing any additional
emissions cap at the state level until 2018. See id. tit. III, subtit. C, § 335; see also id.
tit. III, subtit. B, § 321 (requiring that permits previously issued by California, the
Western Climate Initiative, or the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative be traded in
for the new federal allowances, thereby placing everyone on one system).

139.

Id. tit. IV, subtit. A, § 401.
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higher levels of regulation. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the
cost of the Waxman-Markey bill on the average household will be about $175
per year,140 but other estimates are much higher.141 If the costs of the climate
change regulation are low, then the national legislation may garner widespread
public support for greater regulation.142 But if the cost of regulation is high or
particularly salient (e.g., higher energy bills), then the public’s support for
further measures may be eroded.143
Here, the Waxman-Markey bill’s subsidization of consumer electricity is
notable.144 Subsidizing electricity goes against the bill’s broader efforts to reduce
carbon emissions. If electricity prices are subsidized, then consumers will
presumably use more electricity than they would at the market price, not less.
Yet subsidizing electricity is important for maintaining public support for the
cap-and-trade system. Although dramatically higher electricity prices may
reduce carbon emissions in a static sense, higher prices may also undermine
support for the current system and for later additions to the program.145 Thus,
in a dynamic analysis of the political economy of global warming, subsidization
of consumer electricity prices is most likely a step forward to greater national
and international regulation.
Finally, the cap-and-trade system can create positive feedback effects by
building political bonds. Several environmental and industry groups worked
together to lobby for the Waxman-Markey bill. This collaboration might create
a lasting coalition that will make bargaining at the international level easier,
because the base of domestic support for an international agreement is already
established. But there are reasons to doubt that the coalition built to support
the Waxman-Markey bill will also support an international agreement. First,

140. Cong. Budget Office, The Estimated Costs to Households from the Capand-Trade Provision of H.R. 2454, at 2 (2009), available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090620/cbowaxmanmarkey.pdf.
141.

At the high end, the Heritage Foundation predicts a cost of more than $1200 a
year. William Beach et al., Son of Waxman-Markey: More Politics Makes
for a More Costly Bill (2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
EnergyandEnvironment/wm2450.cfm.

142.

See Roundtable Interview, supra note 18 (statement of President Obama) (noting
twice the importance of protecting consumers from spikes in electricity prices).

143.

There is also concern that the American public does not understand what the real
costs of effective action will be. See Cap and Trade, with Handouts and Loopholes,
Economist, May 23, 2009, at 33, 34 (noting that “America’s leaders do not seem
to think Americans are ready for straight talk about” how much further action
will cost).

144.

See H.R. 2454 tit. III, subtit. B, § 321 (regarding emissions allowances for electric
utilities that must be used to benefit consumers); see also id. tit. IV, subtit. C, § 431
(regarding tax credits and rebates for low-income households to help defray
energy costs).

145.

See supra text accompanying note 142.
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industry groups that formed the coalition with environmental groups may have
supported a national-level agreement as a means of avoiding greater regulation
at the international level. To the extent that industries can say that they made
significant progress on climate change issues by supporting a domestic measure
that they can live with, these industries may resist an international agreement
that requires higher levels of regulation. Second, industries might have only
supported the Waxman-Markey bill because of the emissions subsidies
provided by the federal government. If an international agreement would
require further reductions and additional government subsidies were not
forthcoming, then industry support could evaporate.
Whether the domestic legislation increases support for an international
agreement also depends on the content of the international agreement.
Although it is hard to predict what the exact content of the agreement will be,
we can be relatively confident that the agreement will not divide greenhouse gas
emissions between states based on historic levels of emissions. Thus the United
States legislation, which promises to reduce our emissions levels to 97% of 2005
levels by 2012 and 80% of 2005 levels by 2020, probably still provides for a much
higher level of emissions than an international agreement would mandate. An
international agreement might require the United States to decrease its
emissions levels more radically (imposing higher costs on American industries),
while requiring that developing countries only slow their rate of emissions
growth. American industry is unlikely to support such an agreement even if it
supported domestic legislation.
In sum, the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade system has the potential for
significant positive dynamic effects although the picture is mixed. The system
provides important financial incentives to invest in low-emissions sources of
energy that could decrease the cost of emissions reductions both at home and
abroad. Lowering the costs of emissions reductions also eases the distributional
concerns at the international level making it easier for states to form a
comprehensive climate change agreement. The Waxman-Markey bill also
adopts counterintuitive policies (such as subsidizing consumers’ electricity use)
to maintain public support for environmental regulations. Yet the bill has the
potential for negative feedback effects as it may lead to the growth of highemission industries, which will oppose an international agreement, in
developing states.
C. The Proposed Carbon Tariffs
1.

The Carbon Tariff Model

A carbon tariff is a tax assessed at the nation’s border that raises the costs of
imported goods.146 The tax can be structured in a number of ways. The first
design issue is whether the carbon tax will be imposed multilaterally or
146. Gary C. Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz & Jisun Kim, Global Warming and
the World Trading System 38-46 (2009).
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unilaterally. If a number of states establish a climate change treaty regime, then
those states could impose a carbon tariff on any state that chooses not to join
the regime. Used multilaterally, a carbon tariff can prevent states from freeriding on the efforts of others, which is a serious problem in a global public
good scenario. The downside of the multilateral carbon tariff is that it requires
an international agreement among a core group of states. Alternatively, a state
can unilaterally impose a carbon tariff by applying a border tax to imports from
states with inadequate environmental regulations or to imports that are
produced by emissions-heavy processes.147 The drawback of the unilateral
carbon tariff is that each state can independently decide what good
environmental policy is and impose carbon tariffs on imports that do not meet
those criteria, which can result in conflicting national standards.
An issue for both multilateral and unilateral carbon tariff systems is
deciding the magnitude of the border tax and what goods should be subject to
it. The goal of the multilateral carbon tariff is to have states join the
international agreement, so the size of the tariff should be sufficiently high to
make the costs of joining the international agreement less than the costs of
remaining outside of the agreement. In theory, the tariff need not apply only to
goods with an emissions-heavy production process. If the goal is to have states
join the environmental agreement, then the best strategy may be to impose a
high tax on goods produced by politically powerful domestic entities.148 Here,
the carbon tariff functions like any other sanctioning regime.149 Governments
may want to impose the tariff on emissions-heavy products to reduce carbon
leakage in the immediate term, but the tariff need not be limited to these goods.

147.

See Aaron Cosbey, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Border Carbon
Adjustment 1 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cph_trade
_climate_border_carbon.pdf; Houser et al., supra note 66, at 29-37; Hufbauer
et al., supra note 146, at 39-45; Howard Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade
Measures To Protect the Global Environment, 83 Geo. L.J. 2131 (1995); Laura Nielsen
& Steve Charnovitz, Trade and Climate Change: Limits for Consumption Based
Trade Measures?, 7 Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L. (forthcoming 2010).

148.

See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 403-06 (2003);
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 354-57 (2000).

149. This is the approach to retaliation in the WTO regime (although there are some
restrictions on when cross-sectoral and cross-agreement retaliation can be used
under Article 26 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)). See Jide
Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 215, 222-28 (2005); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade
Organization, 13 J. Legal Stud. 179, 188-92 (2002).
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The goal of a unilateral carbon tariff is less clear. A tariff can be a means of
encouraging other states to adopt higher environmental standards, although
what are adequate standards is determined by the tariff-imposing state
unilaterally. A carbon tariff would only apply to the tariff-imposing state’s
internal market (not to several states’ markets as with a multilateral tariff).150
Consequently, the effectiveness of a unilateral tariff depends on the importance
of the tariff-imposing state’s market to foreign exporters. The larger a state’s
market, the greater the ability it has to encourage other states to adopt higher
environmental standards.
A state may also have the goal of attempting to preserve its national
competitiveness.151 Industry groups often criticize environmental regulation
because it allegedly puts national industry at an unfair competitive disadvantage
to industries in other nations that lack such regulation.152 Industry groups often
advertise a carbon tariff as a means of leveling the playing field.153 There are two
concerns with this approach to defending a state’s competitiveness. First, a
carbon tariff does not preserve the competitiveness of a nation’s exports. The
tariff applies only to the state’s internal market and does not raise the cost of
150.

The most effective carbon tariff would be a multilateral one that includes the
world’s largest import economies. Together, the European Union and the United
States consume over half of the world’s exports. E.U. imports represent
approximately 40% of the world’s total exports. American imports represent
14.5%. See World Trade Org., International Trade Statistics 2008, at 11
(2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008
_e.pdf.

151.

See Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2; Hufbauer et al., supra note 146, at 12; see
also Cap-and-Trade Bill Will Protect U.S. from Unfair Competition, Dingell
Predicts, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 13, 2008) (discussing how a carbon
tariff could protect the international competitiveness of American industry).

152.

See, e.g., Letter from Thomas J. Gibson, President & CEO, Am. Iron & Steel Inst.,
to Members of the House Steel Caucus (Aug. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.steel.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=200910&CONTENTID=33768&T
EMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm; see also Houser et al., supra note 66, at 210; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1212
(1977) (discussing the competitive advantage that one jurisdiction can gain by
having environmental policies that are less restrictive than competing
jurisdictions). But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1211-12 (1992) (arguing that competitive
advantages based on lower regulation do not necessarily lead to a race to the
regulatory bottom).

153.

See Jagdish Bhagwati & Petros C. Mavroidis, Is Action Against US Exports for
Failure To Sign Kyoto Protocol WTO-Legal?, 6 World Trade Rev. 299, 309
(2007); The Conscience of a Liberal, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
06/29/climate-trade-obama/ (June 29, 2009, 9:07 EDT) (stating that a carbon tariff
is “a matter of leveling the playing field”).
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foreign competitors’ goods in foreign markets. Consequently, a carbon tariff
only protects goods in the national market, which will be useful to importcompeting industries but less so to export-oriented industries. Second,
establishing what a level playing field is can be difficult, particularly with the
global warming issue. Whether the carbon tariff is a fair correction for
differences in environmental regulation,154 on the one hand, or an unfair
protection of domestic producers,155 on the other, is determined by our theory
of how much greenhouse gas pollution each nation should be allowed to
produce. This point engages the same issues currently under discussion at the
international level of how to divide the world’s greenhouse gases; whether
China is producing too many greenhouse gas emissions requires a theory that
determines how much pollution China is permitted to produce.156 Because there
is no consensus on how much greenhouse gas a state should be allowed to
produce, there is no uncontroversial or normatively neutral means of applying
a carbon tariff.
Consequently, a key feature of any domestic legislation that chooses to
incorporate a carbon tariff is how to judge what is adequate or comparable
action. As discussed in the following Subsections, governments tend to judge
other nations’ emissions levels based on the government’s preferred theory for
dividing global greenhouse gases. In the Lieberman-Warner bill, the United
States would impose a carbon tariff on states that did not achieve the same
proportionate reduction in greenhouse gases as the United States.157 This metric
matches the American position that states should freeze greenhouse gas
pollution at current levels and decrease emissions from this baseline. Thus, if
the United States reduced emissions by 7% from a 2005 baseline, then other
states would have to do the same to avoid the imposition of a carbon tariff. This
metric is far from uncontroversial as it gives greater rights to pollute in the
future to states that have historically polluted the most.158

154.

Joseph Stiglitz has argued that countries should be applying countervailing duties
to the United States based on an “antidumping” or actionable subsidy basis. See
Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 177-78. As Joost Pauwelyn discusses, Stiglitz’s theory
does not fit well within the current international trade doctrine regarding
subsidies or dumping. See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Change Policy and
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 13-16
(Nicholas Inst. Working Paper, No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://
nicholas.duke.edu/institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf.

155.

Ex-USTRs Urge Caution as Congress, Administration Draft Climate Policies, 26 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1152 (Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Ex-USTRs Urge Caution]
(describing the letter sent by former United States Trade Representatives warning
that carbon tariffs can be a “disguised form of protectionism”).

156.

See supra Section III.B.

157.

S. 3036, 110th Cong., tit. XIII, §§ 1311-1315 (2008).

158.

See supra Section II.C.
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Needless to say, other states would not agree on this basis for applying a
carbon tariff. The European Union could choose to apply a carbon tariff to any
state that has not signed on to the Kyoto Protocol (which is what some
European leaders are threatening if the United States adopts a carbon tariff).159
The EU standard would include the United States but not China or India. In
addition, China and India could apply a tariff based on their per capita
emissions levels. The tariff would apply to any state with per capita emissions
over the Chinese level or the Indian level. This standard would include the
United States and the European Union. As a consequence, the application of a
carbon tariff does not necessarily lead to a uniform isolation of states with
“poor” environmental regulation. Rather, the lack of consensus regarding how
much carbon each state should be allowed to produce creates a patchwork of
tariff barriers that encompass different conceptions of adequate environmental
policies.160 So, in judging the effect of a carbon tariff, one needs to include the
costs and benefits of the United States tariff as well as the costs and benefits of
having several carbon tariffs based on each country’s view of what the division
of greenhouse gases should be.161 As of the writing of this Article, no country has
imposed a carbon tariff, although several countries have stated that they will do
so if the United States proceeds with a carbon tariff.

159.

France To Push EU Member States To Embrace Carbon Border Taxes, 26 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 817 (June 18, 2009) (describing the efforts of French President Nicolas
Sarkozy to have the EU implement a carbon tariff on non-Kyoto members); see
also Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without
the USA: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 Climate
Change 289 (2005) (providing a rationale for such a measure under GATT law).

160. For such reasons, United States Trade Representatives have been wary of carbon
tariffs because they fear retaliation from other states. See Letter from Susan
Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, to Rep. Joe Barton, Ranking Member of the
House Energy and Commerce Comm. (Mar. 4, 2008), available at
http://commontragedies.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/document_daily_01.pdf
[hereinafter Schwab Letter] (noting that carbon tariffs “could easily backfire. . . .
[a]nd other countries could well turn to [carbon tariffs] themselves and develop
their own import restrictions, based on their own unilateral definitions of what
constitutes adequate action by other countries”). Statements from the White
House in 2009 were skeptical about the use of a carbon tariff. See Greg Hitt &
Naftali Bendavid, Obama Wary of Tariff Provisions, Wall St. J., June 29, 2009, at
A3.
161.
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See Schwab Letter, supra note 160; see also Climate Change: Competitiveness
Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing Countries: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior
Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/Hearings/PDF/110
-eaq-hrg.030508.Hufbauer-testimony.pdf (discussing how the most relevant risk
of a carbon tariff was the threat of tit-for-tat retaliation).
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2.

Waxman-Markey and the Lieberman-Warner Carbon Tariffs

Both the Waxman-Markey bill and the Lieberman-Warner bill provide for
the establishment of a carbon tariff, but the two bills do so on different terms.
Under the Waxman-Markey bill, a carbon tariff would apply to imports from a
foreign state starting in 2020, if two conditions applied: (1) the state had not
joined an equitable international agreement; and (2) the state’s greenhouse gas
intensities in the relevant sectors were higher than those of the United States.162
If a country did not sign onto the agreement by that time (or an agreement was
not achieved by that time), then only exports from sectors that had higher
greenhouse gas intensities than the United States would be subject to the
tariff.163 To reduce the threat of carbon leakage, the Waxman-Markey bill
provides rebates to carbon-intensive firms until 2035.164
The Lieberman-Warner bill would establish a stricter carbon tariff, one that
would most likely apply to more countries. Also, beginning in 2020, a carbon
tariff would be applied to exports from countries that have not taken action
“comparable” to that of the United States.165 Comparable action is defined as
achieving the same percentage decrease in greenhouse gas emissions as the
United States achieves from a 2005 baseline.166 Thus, if the United States
managed to achieve a 17% decrease in emissions from 2005 levels by 2020,
countries that did not also achieve the same percentage decrease would be
subject to a carbon tariff. This would almost certainly include most developing
countries where rates of emissions are still increasing (although their per capita
rate of emissions are far better than that of the United States) and could
conceivably include some developed countries (who might have better
percentage rates of decrease if judged from a 1990 baseline but have worse rates
if judged from a 2005 baseline).
The Waxman-Markey bill has yet to pass the Senate, and members of the
Senate appear much more supportive of a carbon tariff than their counterparts
in the House.167 There are demands from key lawmakers that the Senate’s

162.

H.R. 2454 tit. IV, subtit. A, § 401. The carbon tariff would not apply to countries
that the United Nations has classified as “least developed countries,” countries
that produce less than 0.5% of the global greenhouse gases, or countries that
represent less than 5% of U.S. imports in a particular sector. Id.

163.

Id.

164. The Waxman-Markey bill begins to phase out the rebates in 2025, but the
program continues until 2035. Id.
165.

S. 3036 tit. XIII, §§ 1311-1315.

166. Id. The President must notify countries of the estimated percentage change in U.S.
emissions over a ten-year period. Id. § 1313(c). As with the Waxman-Markey bill,
there are exceptions for economically small states. See supra note 162.
167.

Senate To Revise Carbon Tariffs, Kerry Says; Other Democrats Seek Stronger
Protections, [2009] World Trade Org. Rep. (BNA) D2 (July 9, 2009) (quoting
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version of the bill include a stricter carbon tariff, so that the final WaxmanMarkey version would impose the tariff beginning in 2012, when the domestic
cap-and-trade program begins.168 Thus, the final bill to emerge from Congress
may have yet another version of a carbon tariff.169
3.

The Effect of the Proposed Carbon Tariff on International
Negotiations

Carbon tariffs are double-edged as a policy tool. The economic goal of a
carbon tariff is to preserve the competitiveness of national industries (and thus
prevent carbon leakage to lower regulation states), but the tariff can also be a
source of protection for national industries (and thus provide industries with a
competitive advantage that they will be loath to forego). This Article examines
both possibilities. To the extent that it is narrowly tailored to industries that
face high regulatory costs and easy relocation abroad, a carbon tariff can have
positive feedback effects for the demand for an international agreement. The
carbon tariff can keep industries in a high-regulation jurisdiction and thus
increase the demand for cleaner sources of energy. In addition, carbon leakage
to developing countries slows. The political demands within developing
countries to resist an international agreement because of the competitive
advantages will lessen. Both of these effects should aid international
negotiations.
A carbon tariff can also have some negative dynamic feedback effects. If the
carbon tariff applies to industries more broadly, the probability that it is being
used for protectionist purposes increases. Firms are more likely to receive
protection that they do not need. For instance, under the Lieberman-Warner
bill, firms from developed countries with strong environmental regulation
would be subject to a carbon tariff if the exporting country did not match the
U.S. percentage decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. In these cases, domestic
firms and foreign firms are arguably already playing on a level field in terms of
environmental regulation. (The threat of a carbon tariff is particularly galling
for developed countries that have joined the Kyoto Protocol as Annex I
countries and thereby adopted costly environmental regulations while the
United States refused to adopt any greenhouse gas limits.) Here, the carbon
tariff would provide the domestic firm with a price advantage over its foreign
rivals that is unrelated to differences in national regulations. If carbon tariffs are
used as a tool of protection, domestic firms will fight to hold onto them once

Senator Kerry as stating: “We have already come to the conclusion in working on
the Senate bill that we are going to have to change [the carbon tariff provision].”).
168.

Id. (discussing some Democratic Senators’ views that stricter carbon tariffs are
needed and that the current House bill is unacceptable).

169. Obama Urged To Support Border Adjustments in Bill To Cap U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1235 (Sept. 17, 2009) (reporting on a letter
sent by members of the House supporting a stricter carbon tariff).
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they are provided. Domestic firms may resist an international agreement on
climate change if it entails removing the carbon tariff against key competitors.
Thus, domestic legislation can be a stumbling block to an international
agreement; it creates an advantage for domestic firms, which exists only as long
as international negotiations on a comprehensive agreement languish.
Examined under this framework, the Waxman-Markey bill is a notable
improvement over the Lieberman-Warner bill. The Waxman-Markey bill
reduces carbon leakage by providing rebates to carbon-intensive sectors rather
than imposing a carbon tariff. Unlike a carbon tariff, the rebates are not linked
to the successful conclusion of an international agreement.170 Thus, domestic
industries have an economic incentive to support an international agreement as
a way to impose the higher regulatory costs on foreign firms. In addition, if a
carbon tariff is applied, it will be applied in a fine-grained manner. Only foreign
goods in sectors that have higher greenhouse gas intensity than U.S. firms would
be subject to the tariff. This tariff would hit many developing countries but
would be less likely to include developed states with high environmental
standards.
By contrast, the Lieberman-Warner bill would apply the carbon tariff to
more of the carbon-intensive goods produced in a country that did not match
the U.S. percentage rate of decrease in greenhouse gases. This approach lumps a
country’s goods together for the purposes of the carbon tariff instead of
applying a sector-by-sector test as the Waxman-Markey bill does. In addition,
the Lieberman-Warner bill could apply to developed states that have high
environmental regulation but nonetheless are unable to achieve the U.S. rate of
emissions reductions. The United States is relatively late in adopting
greenhouse gas regulations for a developed country and thus might be able to
achieve a greater percentage decrease in emissions than other developed
countries that have equally rigorous (or more rigorous) environmental
standards.171 As a result, this provision of the Lieberman-Warner bill is more
likely than the provision in the Waxman-Markey bill to lead to negative
political feedback effects, where domestic firms view the carbon tariff as a
competitive advantage over foreign firms and thus oppose an international
agreement that would withdraw these benefits.

170.

The rebates are allocated regardless of the status of international negotiations.
H.R. 2454 tit. IV, subtit. A, § 401.

171.

The Lieberman-Warner bill uses a 2005 emissions level as a baseline. This
disadvantages many Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries that started reducing
greenhouse gas emissions in the 1990s in fulfillment of their legal obligations to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions relative to 1990 levels. Consequently, many
developed states already had undertaken the most cost effective emissions
reduction methods by 2005. The United States had not done so by 2005, and thus
its rate of decrease in greenhouse gas emissions may be higher (judged against a
baseline of 2005) than equally rigorous action taken by other developed states. See
supra Section III.A.
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As a matter of leadership in international negotiations, a carbon tariff is
controversial. If an environmental agreement has the support of a core set of
states, a multilateral carbon tariff may be an effective means of encouraging
wide membership. Where there is not an international agreement in place,
however, the threat of a unilateral carbon tariff can complicate international
negotiations.172 The international system is still in the process of creating
consensus on how to address climate change. Countries still have widely varying
views on the best approach to achieving sustainable levels of emissions.173 The
threat of a carbon tariff has damaged this country’s attempt to provide
leadership in international climate change negotiations, because it de facto
sanctions foreign countries if they do not meet the standards unilaterally
established by the United States.
Developing nations view the U.S. demand that other nations either match
American reductions in emissions (the Lieberman-Warner draft) or mandate
industries where energy-intensity levels match or exceed those of U.S. industries
(the Waxman-Markey draft) to avoid a carbon tariff as a step back in
international negotiations. They note that their per capita emissions rates are
far below American rates and emphasize that, on the per capita standard, they
already have “cleaner” economies than the United States. Developing nations
view greenhouse gas emissions as a by-product of development.174 Thus,
proposals to freeze their current rates of emissions are effectively demands that
they sacrifice their development goals.175 For instance, the Indian government
has refused to accept binding limitations on emissions until it achieves a higher
level of development. Responding to American requests to adopt caps on
emissions, the Indian environmental minister, Jairam Ramesh, publicly rebuked
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to India for the American
threat to impose a tariff on Indian goods when the country had such low levels
of per capita emissions.176 Developing countries also argue that the threat of a
carbon tariff ignores developed states’ responsibilities for the current climate
172.

Christopher Weber & Glen Peters, Climate Change Policy and International Trade:
Policy Considerations in the United States, 37 Energy Pol’y 432 (2009); Ex-USTRs
Urge Caution, supra note 155 (quoting a letter from four former U.S. Trade
Representatives that urged Congress “to give the Administration the authority,
flexibility and support to negotiate mutually satisfactory outcomes with
recalcitrant nations. . . . One cannot legislate what must be negotiated.”
(alteration in original)) .

173.

See supra Section II.C.

174.

See Keith Bradsher, American Officials Push China on Climate, N.Y. Times, July 16,
2009, at A10; Landler, supra note 80.

175.

See Shai Oster, Beijing Softens Stand on Emissions Cap, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 2009,
at A7 (noting that China is considering legislation that would result in its carbon
dioxide emissions peaking in 2030, the same time that China expects its own gross
domestic product to exceed that of the United States).

176.

Landler, supra note 80.
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crisis.177 China’s lead climate change negotiator, Yu Qingtai, put the point this
way: “The developed countries, in realizing their industrialization, have
discharged a large amount of greenhouse gases in the course of one or two
centuries. The cumulative emissions by the developed countries have caused
global warming. Who should take the historical responsibilities?”178
Here again, the carbon tariff in the Waxman-Markey bill, while potentially
a stumbling block, represents an improvement over the Lieberman-Warner
tariff. The Waxman-Markey bill gives the President discretion on when to apply
the carbon tariff, which allows the tariff to be a flexible and sophisticated
instrument of diplomacy. Hence, the legislation could provide countries with a
disincentive from delaying a compromise for too long, but it gives countries the
space to reach a consensus without the use of sanctions. By contrast, the
Lieberman-Warner bill is a blunt instrument that does not aid the search for an
international compromise. The carbon tariff would apply to countries that do
not reduce their greenhouse gas emissions at the same rate as the United States.
The Lieberman-Warner proposal further undermines United States
leadership because, until a new international agreement is established, there is
not a safe harbor for countries that wish to sign on to an international
agreement (as there is no treaty regime to join). Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol is
not sufficient to exempt a country from the American carbon tariff because the
United States does not view the Kyoto Protocol as an equitable agreement.179
Thus, many developed and developing countries, which would prefer to
cooperate internationally but are insufficiently influential to bring the major
players to an agreement, cannot avoid American carbon tariffs even if they are
actively engaged in the international negotiation process.
If other states responded in kind to the United States carbon tariff, then the
tariff has the potential to create an industry demand for an international
agreement. A patchwork of national-level carbon tariffs could be a significant

177.

See Oster, supra note 175 (noting that China views limits on emissions as a form of
discrimination against poorer countries). This does not mean, however, that
China is not taking steps to include environmental goals in its development plan.
While relying on coal to produce most of its power, the Chinese government has
been building high efficiency power plants at rates much higher than the United
States. Keith Bradsher, China Far Outpaces U.S. in Building Cleaner Coal-Fired
Plants, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2009, at A1.

178.

Michael Wines, China Sees Progress on Climate Accord but Resists an Emissions
Ceiling, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2009, at A8.

179.

See S. 3036, 110th Cong., tit. VI, § 6003 (2008) (defining U.S. negotiation goals for
an international treaty as an agreement that commits “all major greenhouse gasemitting nations to contribute equitably to the reduction of global greenhouse gas
emissions”); see also S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (declaring that any
international agreement that does not place emissions caps on developing
countries would not be equitable).
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barrier to trade.180 For instance, steel exports from the United States might face
one carbon tariff to enter the European Union market, another tariff to enter
the Chinese market, and yet a third to enter the Canadian market. If the barriers
to trade created by this patchwork regime were sufficiently high, then national
industries in the United States and abroad might prefer an international
agreement that imposed uniform environmental regulations simply as a means
of creating certainty.181 Creating barriers could also be counterproductive to
climate change negotiations, however. Some industry groups may prefer an
international agreement to eliminate barriers to trade, but other industry
groups may appreciate having more barriers to trade.182 For instance, American
industries with carbon-heavy production processes may lobby for a carbon
tariff as protection from international competition and subsequently fight any
legislation that would remove the carbon tariff.183 Consequently, carbon tariffs
may entrench national positions in international negotiations rather than
making compromise easier to achieve.
One of the greatest concerns with a carbon tariff is its potential effect in
framing public opinion regarding what the continuing responsibility of the
United States is and what a fair international agreement would entail. The
national legislation has the potential to lull the public into believing that the
nation has done its part in addressing the issue of climate change.184 A carbon
tariff reinforces this view; the measure creates a framework that defines national
regulation of greenhouse gases as adequate while defining many foreign
regulations as inadequate. This view may give credence to a counterproductive
belief that, having passed national legislation, the nation has fulfilled its
responsibilities for controlling global warming and that further measures are
the responsibility of other nations, such as China and India.
In a related vein, the carbon tariff can skew the public’s view of what
standards a fair international agreement would adopt. The concern is that the
national regime’s approach to applying a carbon tariff will become the public’s
metric for judging whether an international agreement is equitable. The
Lieberman-Warner carbon tariff effectively requires other states to freeze
emissions at 2005 levels and reduce emissions at the same rate as the United
States. The Waxman-Markey bill requires states to have industries with the
same carbon intensity as American industries. Yet both of these standards are
nonstarters for developing states, who are at different stages of development
and have very different views of what an equitable international agreement
180. See Schwab Letter, supra note 160 (noting that a carbon tariff “could easily
backfire. . . . [a]nd other countries could well turn to [carbon tariffs] themselves
and develop their own import restrictions, based on their own unilateral
definitions of what constitutes adequate action by other countries”).
181.

Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 39; Elliott et al., supra note 39.

182.

Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2-10.

183.

See supra p. 298.

184.

See Coglianese & D’Ambrosio, supra note 42, at 1425.
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would involve. In this case, the carbon tariffs may be priming the American
public to resist an international agreement that adopts standards different from
the carbon tariff.
In sum, a multilateral carbon tariff, undertaken as part of an international
climate change agreement, is likely to be a building block to a comprehensive
solution to the problem of global warming. The tariff imposes a cost only on
states that refuse to join the international regime. This fact carries two benefits.
First, it helps reduce the relocation of production to states that remain outside
of the regime. Second, it links contribution to a nonexcludable good (the global
atmosphere) to an excludable good (access to the markets of the regime
members) in a uniform manner and thus gives nonmembers an incentive to
join the environmental regime. Nonmembers of the environmental regime can
be economically isolated.
By contrast, the Waxman-Markey and the Lieberman-Warner carbon
tariffs lack many of the multilateral tariff’s benefits. The unilateral tariff is less
effective in preventing the relocation of industries because the unilateral tariff
only applies to the home state’s internal market. In addition, the unilateral tariff
does not target states that refuse to sign an international agreement but rather
all of the states that the home state considers not to be doing their part. Other
states can play this game as well and impose their own unilateral carbon tariffs.
The result is that many states will be subject to a host of different carbon tariffs
(the United States is unlikely to pass the China’s standards for a carbon tariff),
rather than a few states being economically isolated.
IV. Implications and Extensions
This Article has examined the effects of national legislation on the
provision of global public goods through the lens of climate change, but the
implications of this framework are not limited to the global warming context.
Regulation of global public goods in other areas faces similar two-level games.
National-level legislation influences international negotiations concerning
public goods in positive and negative ways by changing the incentives of private
and public actors both at home and abroad. This Part discusses the issue of
international corruption and American legislative efforts to address this
problem unilaterally through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The
issue of international corruption is too complex to address fully in this work,
but the example of the FCPA demonstrates that many of the same dynamic
feedback effects that exist in the climate change context emerge here as well.
National legislation changed the global politics of corruption, sometimes in
ways that were beneficial and, other times, in ways that were
counterproductive.185

185.

See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 665 (2004).
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A. Global Anticorruption Efforts
Governmental corruption takes a heavy toll on many societies: It
undermines countries’ achievement of their development goals, provides
undemocratic regimes with the resources to maintain power, and warps
policymaking in democratic regimes.186 Corruption is a “global bad” because
the costs of corruption are not limited to the nations in which it occurs.187
Criminal organizations that exist due to corruption in one country (such as
Mexican drug cartels or the Russian mafia) export crime to other states.188
Corruption also reduces the value of foreign aid and leads to higher levels of
communicable disease.189 Finally, it distorts international commerce; firms that

186.

See John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption, Foreign
Aff., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 17, 18-19 (1998); see also Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption:
The Facts, Foreign Pol’y, Summer 1997, at 114. Governmental corruption is now
largely accepted as a problem for economic growth and good governance. This
has not always been the case, however. In the 1960s, many political and economic
theorists viewed corruption as a means of improving the efficiency of developing
countries. See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (1968) (arguing that corruption helped development in many
societies); J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,
61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417, 420 (1967) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of corruption and noting that corruption could be beneficial since it allows for
greater entrepreneurship). This theory is now largely discredited based on
empirical studies. See, e.g., Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, Does
Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?, 122 Pub. Choice 69, 91 (2005)
(rejecting strongly the idea that corruption aids economic development even in
nondemocratic regimes); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values
and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. Legal
Stud. S141, S158-60 (2002) (tracing the history of scholarly thinking on corruption
and development).

187.

See Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in Corruption and the
Global Economy 6, 10-17 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).

188.

Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, Foreign Pol’y,
Winter 1996-1997, at 55, 56. This crime can be a major security problem for
Western nations. For instance, governmental corruption effectively permitted the
sale of nuclear material after the end of the Cold War. Id.

189.

See Transparency Int’l, Corruption in Humanitarian Aid (Transparency
International, Working Paper No. 3, 2006), available at http://
www.transparency.org/content/download/6474/38543/file/working_paper_human
itarian_aid.pdf (discussing how corruption directs aid funds away from the
intended population); Transparency Int’l, Corruption and HIV/AIDS
(Transparency International, Working Paper No. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/policy_positions/ti_pp
_hiv (discussing how corruption undermines efforts to combat the spread of
HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa).
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do not pay bribes are at a competitive disadvantage for government
procurement contracts.190
The paradigmatic case of corruption is a government procurement contract
(such as the contract to build a road, construct a power plant, or purchase
military equipment), where the government official accepts the bid from the
private firm that offers the highest bribe rather than the best economic value for
the country.191 Bribery can engage lower-level government officials as well, as is
the case with bribery of customs officials not to collect taxes or of inspectors to
overlook violations of labor regulations.192 In some regions, bribery of
government officials is necessary to receive government services, such as
receiving police protection or filing a lawsuit.193
International efforts to fight corruption have focused primarily on the
supply side.194 That is, anticorruption efforts have targeted the bribers—the
private actors offering payments to government officials—rather than the
officials accepting the bribes. This path is taken for pragmatic reasons; it does
not reflect a moral view that offering a bribe is worse than accepting a bribe.
Foreign states that enact anticorruption measures often do not have jurisdiction
over the foreign government actors who elicit or accept bribes. By contrast,
foreign nations frequently do have jurisdiction over the multinational
corporations who offer the bribes.

190. Wayne Sandholtz & Mark M. Gray, International Integration and National
Corruption, 57 Int’l Org. 761, 769 (2003).
191.

See Lucinda A. Low et al., Enforcement of the FCPA in the United States: Trends
and the Effects of International Standards, in The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Coping with Heightened Enforcement Risks 83 (Lucinda Low et al.
eds., 2007); Tarullo, supra note 185, at 668-70.

192.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act could cover these acts of corruption as well.
See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 756 (5th Cir. 2004) (indictment of American
businessmen for the bribery of a foreign customs official).

193.

See Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Barometer 9 (2009), available
at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/43788/701097
(collecting
statistics on petty bribery including payments to the police, basic service
providers, and members of the judiciary). Under U.S. law, firms are permitted to
make “grease” payments, i.e., bribes, to government officials in return for services
to which the firm is legally entitled. See Lucinda A. Low, Transnational
Corruption: New Rules for Old Temptations, New Players To Combat a Perennial
Evil, 92 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 151, 152 (1998).

194. See Low, supra note 193, at 152-56 (discussing how the FCPA and the OECD treaty
target the supply side of corruption); Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A.
Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery
Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts
Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 5
(1999) (discussing the FCPA’s criminalizing the offer of a bribe rather than the
receipt of a bribe).
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Preventing international corruption requires collective action; the actions
of one state alone cannot provide the good. Addressing the issue of
international corruption requires coordination of the governments that regulate
multinational corporations operating in their jurisdiction.195 Attempts by a
single government to fight international corruption are likely to be ineffective
because other companies outside of the regulating state’s jurisdiction can
continue to offer bribes. Thus, the regulating government is putting itself at a
competitive disadvantage while not achieving the goal of eliminating
governmental corruption.196
This national legislation has important political feedback effects. As the
next Section describes, multinational corporations that operate in jurisdictions
that adopt anticorruption legislation will suffer competitive disadvantages
relative to companies that operate in jurisdictions that do not have such rules.
Perhaps counterintuitively, this creates a positive feedback effect. The regulated
multinational corporations will thus support an international agreement that
extends anticorruption rules to more jurisdictions.197 There are negative
feedback effects as well. Firms located in countries that do not regulate
international corruption will have a competitive advantage over their regulated
competitors.198 Thus, these firms may resist an international agreement to
maintain their advantage.199 We see both of these effects at work in the
development of the FCPA and OECD treaty on anticorruption efforts.200
B. Background to the FCPA
In 1977, in the wake of the international corruption scandals that became
public during the Watergate hearings, the United States passed its first iteration
of the FCPA.201 The Act, which applies to all American corporations,
criminalizes any attempt to bribe a foreign government official done with the
purpose of obtaining or retaining business.202 American corporations vocally
protested the implementation of the FCPA because the Act was viewed as
putting American corporations at a competitive disadvantage to European or
195.

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S161-62.

196. David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a
New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 457, 461 (1998).
197.

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S162; Low, supra note 193, at 153; Tarullo, supra
note 185, at 675.

198.

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S164; Tarullo, supra note 185, at 674.

199. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S162-64; Tarullo, supra note 185, at 674, 687.
200. Tarullo, supra note 185, at 668-80.
201. Gantz, supra note 196, at 459; George et al., supra note 194, at 5; Alejandro
Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 Duke J. Comp. &
Int’l L. 345, 348-59 (2000).
202. Low, supra note 193, at 151-52 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (1994)).
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Asian enterprises.203 The FCPA did not apply to foreign corporations unless
they had sufficient contacts within the United States or conducted some part of
the bribery scheme within the territory of the United States.204 Of equal
importance, in 1977, the United States government was the only government to
prohibit the bribery of foreign officials abroad.205 The President insisted that
other states would follow the country’s lead and adopt similar restrictions, but
other governments declined to do so.206
After the passage of the FCPA, American firms faced a significant
disadvantage when competing for international contracts.207 American firms
were subject to civil and criminal penalties if they offered “anything of value” to
foreign officials for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business.208 By
contrast, European and Asian firms could continue to offer bribes abroad and
not fear prosecution under the laws of their home countries, if not the laws of
the host country. In fact, many governments classified foreign bribes as a taxdeductible business expense.209 The FCPA hurt American business abroad.
Although it is always difficult to put a dollar amount on the losses from such a
policy, one accounting put the loss at $5.5 billion per year.210
The passage of the FCPA gave non-American firms a competitive
advantage. Foreign governments and firms recognized this advantage. As
Patrick Glynn describes:
Since Congress’s passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977,
European and Asian states have been by and large content to regard the
US law as yet another peculiar expression on America’s Puritanism
penchant for international moralizing. Industrial countries continued
to permit their firms to bribe abroad and deduct such bribes on tax
returns; not only were European and other governments happy to reap
the competitive windfall from America’s lonely boy scout posture, but

203. Glynn et al., supra note 187, at 18; Sandholtz & Gray, supra note 190, at 769.
204. See Low, supra note 193, at 151-52.
205. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S161; George et al., supra note 194, at 19; Glynn
et al., supra note 187, at 22; Sandholtz & Gray, supra note 190, at 769; Tarullo, supra
note 185, at 673-75.
206. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S162; Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz
Heimann, Arrested Development: The Fight Against International Corporate
Bribery, Nat’l Interest, Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 80, 81.
207. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S162; Leiken, supra note 188, at 70; Low,
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on bidding for foreign government contracts).
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anecdotal evidence suggests that some European embassies also even
facilitate such bribery in foreign capitals.211
Daniel Tarullo quotes a European official as stating that his country’s
companies needed a competitive advantage over their more efficient U.S.
competitors.212
American industry took a two-track approach to addressing this
competitive disadvantage.213 First, many American firms sought to repeal or
significantly weaken the FCPA.214 This approach was opposed by some
American businesses that perceived anticorruption policies as good business
practices and sought to keep at least their American rivals bound to the same
rules.215 Second, American firms pushed the United States government to
negotiate an international anticorruption agreement.216 The goal of the
international agreement was to level the playing field by imposing the same
constraints on foreign rivals.217 American industry was nearly unanimous in its
support for an international agreement because it both embodied
anticorruption principles and eliminated the competitive disadvantage.218 An
international agreement was preferable to national action because it would be
“collective disarmament” rather than “unilateral disarmament.”219
C. International Negotiations at the OECD
Although the United States government attempted for several decades to
negotiate an international anticorruption agreement, other governments were
(perhaps unsurprisingly) less than receptive.220 The FCPA had in fact created a
competitive advantage for foreign firms, and foreign governments were
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by the Reagan Administration to eliminate provisions of the FCPA that would
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reluctant to forego that advantage.221 From 1977 to 1994, American efforts to
reach an international agreement on anticorruption efforts went nowhere.222 It
was not until the late 1990s that an OECD anticorruption treaty gained
sufficient political support, when the European public’s shock from a series of
national corruption scandals allowed popular support for anticorruption efforts
to overcome industrial opposition to such policies.223 The European public’s
support for an anticorruption treaty itself may have been, in part, the product
of growing anticorruption norms fostered by organizations such as
Transparency International.224
In 1999, over two decades after the United States passed the FCPA, an
OECD treaty that criminalized the offer of bribes to foreign public officials
became effective.225 Compliance with the OECD treaty is lacking because
governments see an advantage to cheating on the agreement.226 For instance,
the Blair Government halted an investigation examining the alleged bribery of
Saudi officials by its national aerospace company, British Aerospace
Engineering (BAE).227 The evidence from other countries is mixed. Some
European governments appear similarly reluctant to enforce anticorruption
measures rigorously,228 but others are increasing their enforcement efforts. For
instance, the German government brought prosecution against Siemens for its
use of bribes overseas.229 Siemens settled the case by paying over $1 billion in
fines.230 Yet the U.S. Department of Justice remains responsible for over half of
all foreign bribery prosecutions in OECD countries even though it accounts for
only 10% of OECD exports.231 Although the treaty is in place, some domestic
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into force Feb. 13, 1999).
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brought suit against BAE based on a much smaller transaction with the Tanzanian
government. See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Corruption
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governments may still want to maintain a competitive advantage for their
national firms.232
D. The Dynamic Effects of National Legislation in Providing Global Public
Goods
The FCPA legislation highlights the benefits and the pitfalls of unilateral
national legislation in negotiating an international agreement. Unilateral action
at the national level changes bargaining at the international level.233 In the FCPA
case, the United States legislation had two dynamic political feedback effects.
For American firms, the FCPA created a competitive constraint; U.S. companies
were barred from using the business practices that their international
competitors used. This constraint actually created a demand among domestic
firms for an international agreement. Because American firms were bound by
antibribery laws, they wanted their foreign rivals to face the same restrictions.234
For foreign firms, the United States legislation created an unexpected
competitive advantage. Non-American companies obtained international
business through corruption, which they would not otherwise have received.235
Once granted this advantage, foreign firms (and their governments) resisted
attempts to address global corruption for two decades.236
Analyzing the ultimate usefulness of the FCPA in advancing international
efforts to curb global corruption is difficult because it requires constructing a
counterfactual situation; we do not know how anticorruption efforts would
have proceeded without the FCPA. But the costs and the benefits of the national
legislation become clearer when the law is considered as part of a dynamic
process of international bargaining regarding a public good. The FCPA
certainly decreased the number of bribes offered by American corporations, but
it did not necessarily aid the cause of eliminating international corruption, since
non-American firms did not face similar restrictions. A market for bribes
continued to exist. The FCPA certainly helped catalyze an American business
campaign to create a treaty regime to address international corruption. This
effort probably would not have come into being without the FCPA. But the
FCPA also created resistance to an international agreement among foreign firms
and governments. The members of the OECD have subsequently settled on an
international agreement that criminalizes bribery of foreign government
officials. But is this a success? The treaty came into force twenty-two years after
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the United States enacted the FCPA. Without the negative feedback effect
created by United States action, a treaty might have been possible long before
1999. The same dynamics that led foreign governments to resist a treaty still
exist and arguably cause those governments to adopt lax enforcement
procedures. There is no certain answer to whether the passage of the FCPA was
a wise decision if the goal of the United States government was to reduce global
corruption. To evaluate this legislation properly, we must take into account the
effect of the FCPA on actors at home and abroad. But we can say that the
national legislation had mixed effects on international anticorruption efforts; it
shifted the bargaining environment at the international level for good and for
ill.
Conclusion
Deciding whether to pursue incremental legislation is a constant dilemma
in political life.237 A partial measure is more easily achieved and provides
supporters with limited benefits. Incremental steps also have dynamic effects;
the interim measure alters political conditions going forward.238 A half measure
influences when (and if) policymakers will return to issue in the future and
affects public support for additional measures.239 These dynamic effects of
incremental legislation can be positive or negative; they can build greater
support for a more comprehensive regime or undermine progress on a policy
agenda.
The importance of dynamic political feedback effects of incremental
measures is heightened when addressing issues that require international
cooperation, where national measures are often a prelude to international
negotiations. This truth is particularly salient when addressing global public
goods. Unlike international arenas where recalcitrant countries can be cut out
of the benefits of cooperation (such as international trade),240 the global
commons is nonexcludable.241 As this Article discusses, a solution to the climate
change crisis requires multilateral cooperation. National legislation is easier to
achieve in the short term, but depending on the dynamic effects of the
legislation, it may or may not be beneficial to the long-term goal of crafting a
comprehensive solution.
As a consequence, the question of how national-level measures affect
international negotiations should be central in evaluating the merits of national
237.
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Gabriella Blum, Islands of Agreement (2007) (discussing whether interim
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legislation. This requires a change from the traditional orientation of
considering national measures to one that incorporates the insights of the twolevel game. These insights include a more international view of the effect of
legislation, examining not only the effects of the legislation at home but the
effects on domestic politics in foreign countries as well. In addition, we must
focus more attention on the mechanisms that lead to dynamic political change,
analyze the productive and counterproductive effects of each, and construct
legislation to promote positive feedback effects. National legislation at one
point in time can help shape what is politically feasible (domestically and
internationally) later in time. An agreement that is not possible now may
become so if national legislation is crafted carefully to build greater support for
an international agreement over time.
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